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Peter Navarrot
Professor Navarro discusses and evaluates the use of Peformance-Based
Ratemaking ("PBR") as a substitute for traditional Rate Base Regulation
("RBR ") in determining the rates which regulated industries may charge to
their customers. After discussing the importance of PBR from a theoretical
perspective, the author analyses a California case study involving the first
comprehensive application of PBR to the regulation of base rates. Next, the
author examines the basic premises of PBR, focusing on the criticisms of
traditional RBR. This is followed by a discussion of the mechanics of PBR both
in theory and with respect to the California case study. The Article goes on to
consider the use of PBR in both one-period and multi-period contexts, and
finishes with an evaluation of the potential success of PBR as a regulatory
alternative. The author concludes that PBR is unlikely to be a panacea for the
ills of traditional RBR, and that its potential success rests in large part on its
application, design, and implementation.
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Introduction
Adoption of a PBR implies that the traditional rate of return
regulation does not necessarily reveal the efficient costs of the
regulated utility and that the incentive of the PBR will more likely
reveal these costs .... [Aldoption of PBR regulation indicates that
the regulator believes that the utility is not minimizing costs.
California Public Utilities Commission
In the alphabet soup of regulatory acronyms, "PBR" promises to be one
of the most important and potentially dangerous forces shaping public utilities
regulation well into the next century.2 At present, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission ("FERC")3 and public utility commissions ("PUCs")
in twenty states are considering or have already begun to implement some type
of PBR system.4 Over the next few years, the PBR experiment is expected
to spread to virtually every state. 5
PBR stands for Performance-Based Ratemaking,6 a particular technique
through which utility regulators set the rates which utilities may charge to their
customers. PBR involves two basic steps. First, the PBR regulator sets an
initial price based on the utility's observed and projected costs. Next, the
regulator provides the utility with incentives to reduce these costs and pass
some of the resulting savings on to the consumer. To assure that the utility
does not achieve cost savings simply by cutting safety, reliability or quality,
the PBR system must also include a quality-control mechanism.
1. DIVISION OF RATEPAYER ADVOCATES, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, REPORT ON
PERFORMANCE-BASED RATEMAKING FOR SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON Co. at II-C-12 (1994)
(analysis, conclusions, and recommendations to Administrative Law Judge (AUL)).
2. This paper focuses on the application of Performance-Based Ratemaking to the setting
of base rates. As we shall discuss below, PBR mechanisms have also been developed to lower
fuel costs, encourage conservation, increase resource mix diversity, improve capacity factors and
heat rates, reduce pollution, and reward good management practices.
3. For a summary of FERC's latest activities, see FOSTER ASSOCIATES, INC., REPORT No.
2016, UPDATE: STATE REGULATORY AGENDA FOR LDCS SHIFTS TO UNBUNDLING AND
PERFORMANCE-BASED INCENTIVES TO IMPROVE GAS SUPPLY RELIABILITY AND LOWER COSTS,
FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, February 9, 1995, app. at 1.
4. See G. ALLEN COMNES, LAWRENCE BERKELEY LABORATORY, UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA, REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE-BASED RATEMAKING PLANS FOR U.S. GAS DISTRIBUTION
COMPANIES (1994) (discussing the status of PBR in the gas distribution industry).
5. See generally Craig S. Cano, Former Regulators Look to 'Brave New World'in Electric
Business, INSIDE F.E.R.C., Nov. 21, 1994, at 6 (citing former regulators from across the country
who favor the adoption of PBR mechanisms).
6. As Comnes points out, "PBR has its analytical roots in the area of economics known
as incentive regulation." COMNES, supra note 4, at 1. For a review of the literature which
surrounds incentive regulation, see J. J. LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES
IN PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION, (1993); Paul Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, Incentive
Regulation for Electric Utilities, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1986).
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PBR is being touted as an evolutionary method of reforming traditional
rate base regulation for industrial sub-sectors characterized by economies of
scale such as electricity and gas distribution.7 PBR is also being advanced as
a useful transitional ratemaking scheme along the road to more radical
deregulation in technologically changing and increasingly competitive industrial
sectors such as electricity generation' and telecommunications. 9
The basic premise motivating PBR, reflected in the quotation above, is
that under traditional, cost-plus, rate base regulation ("RBR"), utility managers
not only fail to minimize costs but also attempt to conceal the firm's true
minimum cost curve. " This is because RBR creates perverse incentives which
encourage managers to inflate the firm's operation and maintenance expenses,
"goldplate" or over-invest in capital, avoid optimal risk-taking, and otherwise
operate inefficiently.
The purpose of PBR is to solve this "cost minimization-cost revelation"
problem of traditional RBR in a way that encourages utility managers to
operate their firms more efficiently. Ultimately, the goal of PBR is to provide
consumers with lower rates for two important reasons. First, the regulator's
traditional concern with equity has always supported this goal. Second, in a
world of increasing competition not only among countries but also among
states, II regulators have become increasingly aware of the negative role that
inefficient regulation can play in diminishing the competitive advantage of
companies within their jurisdictions. 2 Accordingly, these regulators are
always searching for mechanisms that will make the RBR framework more
7. See Div. OF RATEPAYER ADVOCATES; CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, supra note 1, at 11-1
("PBR may well be a permanent fixture in the regulatory landscape for those monopoly functions
which continue after the Commission completes its plan for restructuring the markets for electricity
in California.").
8. For a challenge to the view that electricity generation no longer exhibits the
characteristics of natural monopoly, see Douglas Gegax & Kenneth Nowotny, Competition and
the Electric Utility Industry. An Evaluation, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 63 (1993). See also Peter
Navarro, The Restructuring Regulator: A Guidebook and Research Agenda For the Electric
Industry, 16 ENERGY L.J. 2 (forthcoming Feb. 1996).
9. As the California PUC has stated, one PBR goal is to "accelerate (and ultimately, to
complete) the trend of increasing competition in the generation side of the business .. . " Div.
OF RATEPAYER ADVOCATES, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, supra note 1, at 11-14.
10. The reason is that if regulators could ascertain the firm's minimum cost structure, they
could, under efficient regulation, set rates so as to force the utility to go there.
11. See, e.g., Drv. OF RATEPAYER ADVOCATES, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, supra note
1, at 1-30 (quoting CPUC President Daniel Fessler's statement that "what San Diego Gas &
Electric and other California utilities are competing against is ... the cost of service in states that
are adjacent to the state of California.").
12. See Peter Navarro, The U.S. Regulatory Environment and International Trade: Lessons
From the Electricity Sector, 8 J. OF POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 466 (1989) (analyzing impact of
rate base regulation on economic competitiveness in electricity sector) [hereinafter Navarro, The
U.S. Regulatory Environment]; Peter Navarro, Creating and Destroying Competitive Advantage,




business-friendly. At this critical point in time, PBR has emerged as the
leading reform candidate, particularly in trend-setting California which has
been particularly hard hit in recent years by a weak economy. 3
This paper addresses the basic policy question of whether PBR is an
effective tool to achieve these goals, or whether, as one critic has warned, it
is merely "a warmed-over version of existing regulatory mechanisms."14 This
paper examines this question both in theory and in practice in an effort to
provide legislators and regulators with a framework for designing, evaluating,
and implementing Performance-Based Ratemaking systems.
At the same time, to borrow from the Bard, we will show that PBR is
neither good nor bad-but that application, design, and implementation make
it so. We shall also argue that PBR is sufficiently flawed as a concept that
would-be reformers should approach it with far less zeal and much more
caution than is now being exhibited in many quarters.
Section I of this paper establishes the empirical foundation of the Article.
It first looks at the role which increasing global competition has played in
motivating the PBR reform trend, and then it briefly reviews the status of PBR
nationwide. The section concludes with a more detailed case study of thefirst
comprehensive application of PBR to base rate regulation. The case study
involves the California PUC's approval of a PBR mechanism for San Diego
Gas & Electric. As we shall see, the California experiment provides an almost
perfect paradigm of how not to implement PBR and is therefore a useful
referent for the theoretical points developed later in the Article.
As mentioned above, the underlying premise behind PBR is the
assumption that regulated firms do not minimize costs. Section II examines this
assumption by briefly presenting the major criticisms of traditional RBR.
Section III provides a theoretical investigation of the three basic steps of PBR:
setting a "baseline revenue requirement," specifying a "sharing mechanism"
to distribute cost savings, and designing a "quality control" mechanism.
Section IV illustrates why PBR is much more likely to be effective as a
transitional tool in a "one-period and deregulate" framework than in a multi-
period model of continuing regulation. The paper concludes with a summary
and discussion of policy implications, including the very central observation
that PBR is unlikely to be a panacea for the ills of traditional RBR.
I. PBR in Practice
While calls to reform traditional rate base regulation have historically
13. See Div. OF STRATEGIC PLANNING, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, CALIFORNIA'S
ELECTRIC SERVICES INDUSTRY: PERSPECTIVES ON THE PAST, STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE
(1993).
14. DiV. OF RATEPAYER ADVOCATES, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, supra note 1, at 11-15.
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been motivated by concerns over fairness to ratepayers, the intense pressures
of an increasingly competitive global economy have significantly raised the
regulatory reform stakes. Indeed, the perceived need within the regulatory
community to increase the economic competitiveness of America's key
regulated industries ultimately is the major motivation driving PBR,
particularly in California, the cradle of this regulatory evolution. 5
For example, over the past decade, California's industrial base has been
rocked by increasing competition both in low-end, labor-intensive industries
such as textiles and high-end, technology-driven industries such as aerospace
and computers.' 6 This competition has come not only from countries like
Japan and Taiwan but also from adjacent "job pirating" states like New
Mexico and Arizona where electricity rates range as low as half of those in
California.
Both within the regulatory community and throughout the broader
political environment, there is an increasing realization that key industrial
sectors such as electricity, gas, and telecommunications can play key roles in
creating or destroying competitive advantage. 7 The recent realization of the
economic consequences of inefficient regulation takes the ratemaking critique
far beyond traditional concerns with ratepayer equity into the even more
politically super-charged realm of employment opportunities, tax base, and
wage levels. Indeed, it is the deep and growing concern over industrial
competitiveness that is ultimately fueling the PBR experiment. In evaluating
PBR, it is important to keep this in mind, because a poorly designed PBR
experiment can actually make the economic situation worse.
A. The Growing PBR Trend
Incentive regulation has no universally accepted definition, but
it can be seen as an attempt to . .. . encourage efficient utility
performance. Central to any effective incentive strategy is a test to
measure utility performance in the absence of the competitive
marketplace. "
PBR is a subset of what economists refer to as "incentive regulation."" 9
15. See generally Div. OF STRATEGIC PLANNING, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, supra note
13 (stating that regulatory regime was a dinosaur which was incompatible with industry structure,
and proposing various reforms).
16. See id. at 94-112.
17. See generally Navarro, The U.S. Regulatory Environment, supra note 12.
18. DAVID BOND, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, USE OF INCENTIVES IN ELECTRIC UTILITY
REGULATION 2 (1991).




Incentive regulation has been proposed as an alternative to traditional rate base
regulation. Under this very broad definitional umbrella, regulated utilities may
be offered rewards and/or penalties as incentives to minimize costs, lower
rates, or improve some other aspect of performance.2" Incentive regulation
has been used extensively in both the telecommunications and railroad
industries.21 While its use in both the electricity and natural gas industries is
less extensive,22 in both of these industries its use is rapidly growing. At the
federal level, FERC passed a comprehensive policy statement in 1992 in which
it approved incentive ratemaking for natural gas pipelines, oil pipelines, and
electric utilities 3
Performance-Based Regulation is one variant of incentive regulation. As
its name suggests, PBR focuses on various aspects of the regulated utility's
performance characteristics. While the subject of this Article is the
comprehensive use of PBR for base rate determination (explained further
below), PBR mechanisms have also been developed to lower fuel costs,
encourage conservation, increase resource mix diversity, improve capacity
factors and heat rates, reduce pollution, and reward good management
practices.
Each of these PBR mechanisms sets some sort of threshold performance
level. This might be a target capacity factor or fuel price. Alternatively, it may
be an overall price cap. If the utility beats the target, it is either rewarded or,
in a tougher variation, simply not penalized.
For example, if a utility is able to lower its fuel costs through improved
fuel procurement or increased powerplant efficiency, its shareholders may be
allowed to share in the savings. Similarly, if the utility increases the level of
conservation or the amount of renewables in its resource mix, it may be given
a higher rate of return. In the harshest case, a utility might simply be able to
avoid a penalty or cost disallowance by meeting or beating the target.
In the electricity industry, Fuel Cost PBR mechanisms focus on fuel and
purchased power costs as well as powerplant performance. They are used to
encourage utilities to improve their fuel procurement practices, improve their
heat rate efficiencies, and increase the capacity factors of those baseload power
plants with the lowest marginal costs of generation (e.g., nuclear). Regulators
in Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Maryland,
20. See Lorenzo Brown, et al., Toward Improved and Practical Incentive Regulation, 3
J. OF REG. ECON. 323 (1991); Sanford V. Berg & Jinook Jeong, An Evaluation of Incentive
Regulation for Electric Utilities, 3 J. OF REG. ECON. 45 (1991).
21. See, e.g., M. N. Lowry, The Case for Indexed Price Caps for U.S. Electric Utilities,
4 ELECTRICIrY J. 8 (1991).
22. See COMNES, supra note 4 (discussing use of incentive regulation in natural gas
industry).
23. 57 Fed. Reg. 55231 (Nov. 24, 1992) (PL92-1-000). FERC established only general
principles and left it up to the utilities to devise specifics.
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Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, and New York have all
used or are currently using Fuel Cost PBR mechanisms. Some of these states,
such as Arkansas, Arizona, and Delaware, have used a system of rewards and
penalties while other states, such as Colorado and Connecticut, have used only
penalties.24
Conservation PBR mechanisms and the related Resource Acquisition PBR
mechanisms are also being used in the electricity industry to promote utility
investment in Demand Side Management (DSM) and renewable energy sources
through Integrated Resource Planning (IRP). For example, in Kansas, the PUC
allows a higher rate of return on investment in such measures.25 Similarly,
in Oregon, the PUC provides a cross-subsidy to conservation investments. 26
Other states with such programs include California and Washington.
Managerial PBR mechanisms are designed to improve overall efficiency
in some aspect of the utility's operation. For example, the Iowa PUC has
established a set of management efficiency standards which are applied to rate
cases. The PUC has the discretion to reward good management practices and
penalize bad ones. The criteria it may consider include but are not limited to
price per unit of service, operations and maintenance per unit of service, the
five highest managerial salaries in relation to total revenues, the company's
bad debt ratio, and innovative ideas implemented by management.27 Other
states with Managerial PBR mechanisms include Texas and Wisconsin.2 s
As indicated above, the focus of this Article is on Base Rate PBR
mechanisms. This is arguably the most important type of PBR since it is the
most comprehensive application possible. Under a Base Rate PBR mechanism,
an overall revenue requirement for the utility is calculated. Using cost of
service criteria, rates for each individual customer class can then be set. In the
electricity industry, San Diego Gas & Electric was the first and is to date the
only electric utility to secure approval of a Base Rate PBR mechanism. As we
shall discuss in much greater detail below, establishing a Base Rate PBR
mechanism involves three basic steps.
First, the PBR regulator must set a starting point or "baseline" revenue
requirement to begin the experiment. In doing so, it must also adjust the
baseline upwards for inflation and downwards for projected productivity
increases. Second, the PBR regulator must provide utility managers with a
package of incentives to encourage these managers to produce at a cost below
this baseline. Operationally, this means designing a sharing mechanism to
distribute any realized cost savings between ratepayers and shareholders. This
24. BOND, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, supra note 18, at 5-6.
25. Id. at 18-19.
26. Id. at 19.
27. Id. at 24.
28. Wisconsin has also adopted a PBR mechanism to reduce air pollution emissions.
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must be done in a way which preserves the managers' incentives to pursue
such savings while also passing some savings on to the consumer, so as to
advance the goals of equity and economic competitiveness. Finally, the PBR
regulator must include some type of "quality control" mechanism to insure that
the utility does not pursue cost savings at the expense of system reliability,
safety, customer satisfaction, or other measures of quality.
At present, San Diego Gas & Electric is the only electric utility in the
nation with a Base Rate PBR. However, in California, both Southern
California Edison and Pacific Gas & Electric have applied for their own PBRs.
At the same time, the possible use of Base Rate PBRs has become an essential
part of a broader national policy discussion regarding the restructuring of the
electricity industry.29 The restructuring blueprint typically includes three
steps: (1) complete deregulation of electricity generation; (2) fair and open
access to the transmission grid; and (3) replacement of traditional rate base
regulation of electricity distribution with a Base Rate PBR. The California
PUC, which is at the forefront of this restructuring movement, has published
a comprehensive rulemaking decision embracing all three of these steps.3"
Other states, including Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Rhode
Island are now in some stage of the deliberative process on restructuring. 31
B. San Diego Gas & Electric's Base Rate PBR
In October of 1992, San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) filed an
application with the California PUC to convert from a traditional RBR system
to a PBR framework for the purpose of establishing base rates.32 In filing its
application, SDG&E stated its belief that "market forces should have an impact
on utility and regulator decision-making" and cited the need to "reduce the
29. For an in-depth analysis of restructuring issues, see Navarro, The Restructuring
Regulator: A Guidebook and Research Agenda, supra note 8.
30. CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, PROPOSED POLICY DECISION ADOPTING A PREFERRED
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, (Decision Number 95-05-045) (May 24, 1995).
31. For details regarding Massachusetts and Rhode Island, see The News in Focus,
ELECTRICITY J., July 1995, at 13-14 (describing recent developments in deliberative processes
in Rhode Island and Massachusetts). See also Industrial Energy Bulletin, September 8, 1995
(summarizing recent electric industry regulatory reforms in twenty-six different states).
32. Application of San Diego Gas & Electric Company to Establish an Experimental
Performance-Based Ratemaking Mechanism Before the Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n (Application
Number 92-10-017) (October 16, 1992) [hereinafter Application].
The SDG&E application was part of a broader three-part experimental program to
restructure rate regulation for natural gas procurement, electric generation and dispatch, and
energy procurement. SDG&E first proposed such an experiment in the above-cited application.
For a more complete legislative history, see Proposed Decision of AL Wetzell regarding the
Application of San Diego Gas & Electric Company to Establish an Experimental Performance-
Based Ratemaking Mechanism, at 4-7 (Application Number 92-10-017) (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n,
July 1, 1994) [hereinafter AIJ Decision].
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significant burden and regulatory inefficiency that arise from traditional
regulatory oversight . . . . " SDG&E was subsequently joined by the
California PUC's Division of Ratepayer Advocates ("DRA") and the Federal
Executive Agencies ("FEA") in submitting a Joint Proposal on December 7,
1993," 4 while the consumer advocacy group, the Utility Consumers Action
Network ("UCAN"), submitted testimony in opposition to the Joint
Proposal."
In its application, SDG&E made proposals regarding the three necessary
mechanisms of a PBR system: (1) a revenue baseline requirement; (2) a
sharing mechanism; and (3) a quality control mechanism. It first proposed a
revenue requirement baseline and adjustments to that baseline according to its
own firm-specific, econometric data. As we shall see below, these econometric
results may have been "strategically gamed" for the purpose of inflating the
baseline revenue requirement. In addition, the California PUC specifically
rejected the use of a "Statistical Benchmark Model" which could have been
used to better calibrate the baseline. Second, SDG&E argued for a regressive
sharing mechanism that featured 100 percent of savings to shareholders for the
first 100 basis points above the company's authorized rate of return, 75 percent
of savings between 100 and 150 basis points, and 50 percent above 150 basis
points.36 As we shall argue below, the preferred sharing mechanism should
have been a progressive sharing mechanism in which the utility's share of
savings would rise with the amount of cost savings achieved. Third, SDG&E
proposed quality control parameters of employee safety, customer satisfaction,
and system reliability. In addition to these three mechanisms, SDG&E
advocated a fourth mechanism which was not directly linked to SDG&E's
performance. This mechanism involved a comparison of SDG&E's rates to a
national rate index.37 However, as we shall argue further below, the use of
this fourth mechanism is inappropriate for quality control because such a rate
index is influenced far more by exogenous factors such as relative fuel prices
than managerial decisions.
On August 3, 1994, the California PUC issued a decision 8 that
33. Application, supra note 32, at 4-5.
34. Prepared Direct Joint Testimony on Performance-Based Ratemaking Base Rate
Mechanism for San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (Application Number 92-10-017) (Cal. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, December 7, 1993) [hereinafter Joint Testimony].
35. See William B. Marcus, Utility Consumers Action Network, UCAN's Evaluation of
SDG&E's Performance-Based Ratemaking Base Rate Mechanism (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Dec.
7, 1993) (Application Number 92-10-017) (prepared testimony) [hereinafter UCAN's Evaluation].
36. Joint Testimony, supra note 34, at 15.
37. Id. at 17.
38. As the California Department of General Services has noted, "This case is additionally
important because the Commission's resolution of many of the issues in this proceeding may be
viewed as precedent-setting for the upcoming Southern California Edison Company ("SCE") and
Pacific Gas & Electric Company ("PG&E") PBR cases." Opening Brief of the California Dept.
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essentially endorsed, in toto, SDG&E's application. This decision came despite
significant opposition from the consumer advocacy group UCAN.39 In its
testimony, UCAN argued that the SDG&E baseline revenue requirement was
too high and would lead to false accounting savings rather than real ones.'
UCAN also argued that the regressive sharing mechanism would lead to
minimal cost savings,4" that it was inappropriate to reward utilities for
maintaining quality,42 and that the use of a national rate index was
inappropriate.43 UCAN's testimony predicted that the SDG&E package would
not result in significantly lower rates for electricity customers and predicted
that rates would actually rise, in direct contradiction to the California PUC's
avowed goal of improving the competitiveness of the California economy.'
UCAN's warnings seem to have been borne out by the first report filed
by SDG&E. This report documents the results of its PBR experiment to
date.4' In the first year of PBR, SDG&E earned a rate of return of 10.17
percent or 114 basis points above the established baseline of 9.03 percent, and
achieved $55.4 million in before-tax cost savings. Under the regressive sharing
formula, utility shareholders received $31.9 million in additional profits while
ratepayers received only $1.1 million.
In addition, SDG&E shareholders received $7 million in rewards
associated with their quality control mechanism. It received $3 million for its
non-price performance regarding employee safety-even though it failed to
meet its 1994 safety goal." More importantly, SDG&E received an additional
$2 million based on its performance relative to the national rate index. This
was despite the fact that, based on its rates, SDG&E's position on the index
actually rose from 132 percent in 1992 to 135 percent during the PBR
period .
of General Services at 2, Application of San Diego Gas & Electric Co. to Establish an
Experimental Performance-Based Ratemaking Mechanism (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Feb. 24,
1994) (Application Number 92-10-017).
39. See UCAN's Evaluation, supra note 35. For an overview of UCAN's critique, see
also Opening Concurrent Brief of Utility Consumers' Action Network, Application of San Diego
Gas & Electric Co. to Establish an Experimental Performance-Based Ratemaking Mechanism (U
902-M) (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, February 24, 1994) (Application Number 92-10-017)
[hereinafter UCAN's Opening Concurrent Brief].
40. UCAN's Opening Concurrent Brief, supra note 39, at 25.
41. UCAN's Evaluation, supra note 35, at 20.
42. See UCAN's Opening Concurrent Brief, supra note 39, at 66.
43. Id. at 71.
44. William Marcus's Memo to UCAN, SDG&E PBR Rate Forecasting (July 22, 1994)
(on file with author).
45. SAN DIEGo GAS & ELECTRIC Co., PBR BASE RATE MECHANISM FINAL PERFORMANCE
REPORT [FOR] 1994 (May 15, 1995) (on file with author).
46. SDG&E achieved a score of 1.04 on the OSHA lost-time accident index. Its goal was
1.0.
47. The remaining two million dollars in performance bonuses came about from improved
customer satisfaction, as measured by a customer survey.
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The bottom line is that under PBR, SDG&E shareholders gained almost
$40 million in after tax earnings.48 At the same time, after receiving 1.1
million dollars in shared savings and paying seven million dollars in
performance bonuses, ratepayers lost $5.9 million.4 9
If the goal of PBR as stated by the California PUC is to reduce electricity
rates and thereby improve the economic competitiveness of the state,
California's PBR experiment appears, at least thus far, to be an abject failure.
It should serve more as a warning sign of the dangers of PBR than as a
precedent or model for other states to adopt. In the remainder of this paper,
we shall conduct a theoretical examination of the important properties of PBR
in order to demonstrate why and how the California experiment went wrong.
We shall begin this examination with a discussion of the basic assumption
underlying PBR, and the argument as to why it should be substituted for
traditional rate base regulation.
II. The PBR Premise
The three-part economic rationale for traditional cost-plus, rate base
regulation or "RBR" is illustrated in Figure One. First, electricity and natural
gas distribution are sectors which have traditionally been thought to be natural
monopolies due to the economies of scale and density which extend over the
relevant range of their production. Government intervention into pricing in
natural monopolies is thought necessary to minimize the deadweight loss which
results from the allocative inefficiency of monopoly pricing. This deadweight
loss is measured by the triangle AFD in Figure One. The loss results because,
absent government intervention, the profit-maximizing monopolist will set price
at Pm and quantity at Q. where marginal revenue equals marginal cost rather
than at the allocatively efficient Pm, and Qmc where price equals marginal
cost.50
Second, given the need for government intervention, cost-plus regulation
in which price (P,) is set to average cost (at point C in the Figure) is a second-
48. For further discussion, see Michael Shames, Utility Consumers' Action Network,
Comments in Response to Proposed Majority and Minority Decisions, (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n,
July 24, 1995) (Rulemaking Number 94-04-031) (Investigation Number 94-04-032) [hereinafter
UCAN's Comments]; See also San Diego Gas & Electric Co., Memo to Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n
(Aug. 23, 1995) (on file with author).
49. This figure is obtained by subtracting the $1,100,000 ratepayers gained in shared
savings from the $7,000,000 they gave to SDG&E in performance bonuses. UCAN's Comments,
supra note 48, at 36.
50. This result can be found in any microeconomics textbook. There is an entire literature
on "contestable markets" that argues that in the case where monopoly markets are contestable,
the monopolist will actually price closer to the competitive model than the monopoly model. See,





best option that avoids the political problem of providing a government subsidy
for private industry. This subsidy would be necessary under the "price equals
marginal cost" or allocatively efficient pricing rule because, as noted above,
under such a rule the regulator would set price at PmC and quantity at Qmc. At
these price levels, the utility would be operating at a loss and would need a
government subsidy roughly equal to the area within PmcPacCD in Figure One
in order to break even.
Finally, regulation is the preferred form of intervention in America
because it avoids the more socialistic option of government ownership of the
industry itself.51
Under traditional RBR, rates are set by the following average cost or
"cost plus" formula:52
R = rB + VOCs (Equation 1)
R is the firm's revenue requirement, r is the firm's market cost of capital, B
is the capital stock or "rate base" (net of depreciation), and VOCs are the
variable operating costs associated with production, such as fuel and labor.
Price is set by dividing the revenue requirement R by projected demand Q as
shown below:
P = R/Q (Equation 2)
While regulators have developed numerous mechanisms such as
"prudency reviews" and the "used and useful standard" to prevent utilities
from simply passing through unnecessary costs, the regulatory bureaucracy has
been just as busy devising mechanisms such as attrition allowances and fuel
adjustment clauses which facilitate such cost pass-throughs.53 At the same
time, the discretionary nature of estimating a firm's actual market cost of
capital has preserved a great deal of flexibility in the crafting of revenue
requirements, regardless of the precision with which the rate base and variable
51. Japan is the only other major country in the world that uses RBR on a wide scale. Most
other major countries prefer public ownership of their electricity industry. See Navarro, Creating
and Destroying Competitive Advantage, supra note 12, at 207-08.
52. A classic primer on rate base regulation is JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC UTILITY RATES (1961).
53. The hazard of such pass-throughs for cost efficient operations is obvious. For example,
the California PUC's Electric Revenue Adjustment Mechanism (ERAM) "guarantees that [Southern
California] Edison's base rate revenues will arrive intact no matter what happens to affect sales
. . " Because of this, the Commission's Division of Ratepayer Advocates rails at "the
predicament of Edison's customers who chafe at having to take harsh steps to compete in difficult
economic times as they see Edison unscathed, immune from the ordinary pressures of the
marketplace." DIV. OF RATEPAYER ADVOCATES, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, supra note 1, at II-
13.
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operating costs are measured.54
Because of the cost-plus nature of the formula and the discretionary
component of the market return, rate cases have far too often deteriorated into
a litigation-intensive "game" in which utility managers strategically seek to
overstate their costs, obtain generous pass-throughs, and inflate their market
cost of capital, while ratepayer interests face strong incentives to do just the
opposite." PBR is a response to this game-theoretic problem and is based on
the assumption that utility managers will not voluntarily minimize costs under
RBR and regulators will lack the complete information to force them to do so.
This premise is illustrated in Figure Two.
In Figure Two, the firm's minimum average cost curve is at ACm, and
its observed average cost curve is at ACb,. Under RBR, price is set equal to
ACob,, and the utility operates at point A at a price of Pob,. 56 However, if the
utility's ACmm were known, the RBR regulator could set price at Pm,,, and the
utility would be forced to operate at point B. The result would be cost savings
roughly equal to the area of the polygon Pob,ABPn. (As discussed below, the
distribution of these potential cost savings is a key factor in the design of
PBR's incentive structure.)
A major focus of the PBR experiment is to design a system of incentives
that encourages utility managers to pursue these savings both in the short and
long run.57 Operationally, this means moving the utility from operating on
ACob, to ACm.i.
58
54. For an excellent discussion of the numerous and often competing methodologies to
estimate a utility's cost of capital, see HOWARD THOMPSON, REGULATORY FINANCE: FINANCIAL
FOUNDATIONS OF RATE OF RETURN REGULATION (1991). These methodologies include comparable
earnings and discounted cash flow, risk analysis and the capital asset pricing model, and arbitrage
price theory. See also Jeffrey A. Dubin and Peter Navarro, Regulatory Climate and the Cost of
Capital, in REGULATORY REFORM AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 141 (Michael A. Crew ed., 1982).
55. Viewed through the lens of George Stigler's capture theory, the ultimate result depends
on the relative political power of the rent-seekers involved in the game, principally ratepayers and
shareholders. (Note, however, that different classes of ratepayers, e.g., residential versus
industrial, are often also at war with each other over issues such as cross-subsidization and
interruptibility of service.) The capture theory is presented in George J. Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
56. Of course, regulators will conduct prudency reviews and the like, but the operative
PBR assumption is that because of incomplete information and the set of perverse incentives which
the utility faces, the result will be P = ACob.
57. In the longer run, capital is allowed to vary. Since non-optimal capital investment is
one of the major symptoms of inefficient RBR, it is useful to keep this distinction in mind. (The
primary short run problem is inflated operations and maintenance expenses).
58. This dynamic shares some similarities with the expected behavior of utilities under
traditional RBR in the presence of regulatory lag. In particular, in a general rate case in which
rates are set over a three or five-year period, the utility has strong incentives to produce at costs
lower than those projected in the rate case and thereby earn an actual rate of return higher than
the allowed return. The difference with PBR is that the utility is given an explicit "green light"





Table I. Traditional Complaints About Rate Base Regulation
(1) Inflated Operations and Maintenance Costs
(2) Over or Under-Investment in Capital
(3) Reduced Rate of Technological Change
(4) Excessive Administrative and Compliance Costs
(5) Destruction of Competitive Trade Advantage
In considering the effective design of such a PBR system, it is first useful
to explore the set of perverse regulatory incentives that historically have caused
the observed AC to deviate from the minimum AC under traditional RBR.
Only by understanding these incentives will it be possible to determine whether
the PBR system can alter them and achieve the desired goal of moving the
utility from point A to point B, thereby minimizing costs.
Table I summarizes what has become a rather long litany of well-accepted
criticisms of the perverse incentives which RBR creates. These complaints fall
into two broad categories: (1) concerns over the inefficiencies associated with
cost-plus RBR in natural monopoly industries; and (2) the impact that RBR has
had on potentially competitive segments of regulated industrial sectors.
A. RBR and the Ills of Monopoly
According to proponents, a major goal of Performance-Based Ratemaking
is to eliminate the inefficiencies of cost-plus, rate base regulation in
monopolistic industries characterized by economies of scale or density.59 The
electricity and gas distribution sectors share these characteristics, and as such
they suffer from regulatory inefficiencies such as inflated operation and
maintenance costs, over-investment or under-investment in capital, and
excessive administrative and legal costs.
1. Inflated Operations and Maintenance Costs
It has become almost axiomatic that cost-plus anything-whether it be
rate of return regulation or defense contracting procurement-is an open
59. See, e.g., COMNES, supra note 4, at 4-10. Note also that the proponents of PBR
assume that PUCs are working on behalf of consumers rather than as "captured" regulators
promoting the monopoly goals of their regulatees-an assumption not always supported by the
evidence.
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invitation to what economist Harvey Leibenstein first called technical or "X-
inefficiency." 6 Specifically, Leibenstein argued that absent competitive
pressures, monopolists seeking the "quiet life" will fail to pursue aggressive
cost-minimization even though this might increase profits to shareholders. The
result is Leibenstein's X-inefficiency, portrayed in Figure Two as the chasm
between the firm's observed and minimum average cost curves. Subsequent
discussion has identified at least two sources of this X-inefficiency: expense
preferencing and risk-aversion.
First, utility-maximizing managers face strong incentives to bloat the cost
curve by using the firm's revenue stream to finance the consumption of
"expense preferences" and perquisites such as larger and more plush offices,
the use of corporate jets or company cars, excessive staff, and so on.6 Such
consumption of "perks" may be traced back to the separation of ownership and
control in the modern corporation. This separation in an imperfect capital
market allows managers to pursue their own goals at the expense of
shareholders.62
The PBR experiment to date does not recognize this separation and makes
the heroic assumption that utility managers will pursue cost savings for the
sake of enriching shareholders.63 The separation of ownership and control
makes this assumption extremely problematic. Until the PBR experiment takes
into account this divergence of interest, it 'will be difficult for the PBR
mechanism to eliminate this particular source of cost inefficiency. The best
antidote to this "agency theory problem" is increased competition in all sectors
of the electricity market-particularly generation and distribution. This is
because firms in a competitive environment will face loss of market share in
the short run and bankruptcy in the long run if they bloat their cost structure.
Hence, the greater the competition, the less organizational slack there is in the
system and the less likely it will be that managers will favor the consumption
of expense preferences over the delivery of shareholder profits.
As we discuss below in Section IV, competitive pressures in a PBR
60. Harvey Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. X-Efficiency, 56 Am. Econ. Rev. 392
(1966). Leibenstein's argument focused on the quiet life of monopolists but is easily extended to
the regulatory environment. See also M.A. CREW AND P.R. KLEINDORFER, THE ECONOMICS OF
PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1979).
61. There is a rich literature on the topic of utility maximization and expense preferences
that arguably begins with the path-breaking theory of managerial discretion set forth in OLIVER
E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR: MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES IN
A THEORY OF THE FIRM (1964).
62. This issue is also often discussed in terms of the "principal-agent" problem. For
discussion within the context of incentive regulation, see GLENN BLACKMON, INCENTIVE
REGULATION AND THE REGULATION OF INCENTIVES (1994).
63. As noted earlier, it also makes the perhaps equally heroic assumption that the PUCs





framework are much more likely to emerge in a "one period model" in which
PBR is used as a bridge to the deregulation of electricity generation than in
a multi-period model in which PBR is used as a substitute for RBR in the
distribution market. However, we shall also show that in the multi-period
model, it may be possible to improve the outcome by introducing "direct
access" for customers and "retail wheeling" into the distribution market, as
well as specific "Managerial PBRs." In addition, we shall point out that the
"contestability" of the electricity market will play an important role in the
ultimate success of PBR. As William Baumol has argued, a monopoly firm
will tend to price more like a firm under perfect competition if the market is
"contestable," i.e., if there is a credible threat of entry into the market.
Moreover, the greater the contestability, the closer the price will be to the
competitive outcome in which price equals marginal cost.' Utilities in the
electricity-generation market are already being directly contested by
independent power producers and indirectly contested by the growing threat
of system bypass. Such bypass can occur at the individual customer level when
large industrial consumers choose to self-generate, or at the local level when
a city uses its powers to "municipalize" the distribution grid.
The second, and perhaps more tractable problem is excessive risk
aversion." Under a regulatory umbrella that allows full cost recovery, utility
managers have a reduced incentive to pursue risk-taking investment that might
reduce costs.66 The reason is straightforward: under the cost-plus system, all
reasonably incurred costs are recoverable and it is very difficult to prove in
a regulatory proceeding that the failure to undertake a cost-saving investment
such as a new powerplant is responsible for creating unreasonable costs. Put
another way, cost-plus regulation breeds risk-averse managers, and PBR seeks
to solve this by designing a system of rewards that encourages risk-taking by
allowing the utility to share in the benefits of cost savings.67
2. Averch-Johnson and Reverse Averch-Johnson Effects
As a variation on the X-inefficiency theme described above, RBR can
64. For a general discussion of contestable markets, see BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note
50, at 533-34.
65. Excessive risk aversion may actually be viewed as a perk.
66. See Div. OF RATEPAYER ADVOCATES, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, supra note 1, at
II-1I ("Since the utility's revenue requirement is largely on cruise control, and since it is virtually
made whole for departures from expected revenues or fuel expenses ... management's motivation
to control expenses and thus prices is largely absent.").
67. As San Diego Gas & Electric Co. stated in its PBR application, "Existing regulation
does not encourage utilities to take risks that might benefit customers because it fails to reward
the utility for beneficial outcomes arising from having taken such risks." Joint Testimony, supra
note 34, at 4-5.
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also lead to long run cost inefficiencies due to a non-optimal level of capital
investment but for a different reason than simple risk aversion. Specifically,
economists Averch and Johnson wrote a seminal paper in the 1960s arguing
that when the allowed regulatory rate of return is set higher than the firm's
market cost of capital, utility managers will "goldplate" or over-invest in
capital equipment. 68 This creates an allocatively inefficient deadweight loss
and causes rates to be higher than they otherwise would be.69
Twenty years later, in an era of high inflation, rapidly rising energy
costs, and regulatory "rate suppression" due to the political influence of
ratepayers, economists extended the AJ argument to include a "Reverse AJ
Effect."70 This argument predicts that when the allowed rate of return falls
below the market cost of capital, utilities may well under-invest in capital
equipment.
In the case of the electricity industry, for example, this Reverse-AJ Effect
might manifest itself as a tendency to defer maintenance (the "O+M
Squeeze"), the failure to build enough new capacity to meet projected demand,
or a preference for fuel-intensive options such as gas turbines as opposed to
more capital-intensive options such as central station powerplants.71 Over
time, this Reverse AJ Effect can lead to inefficiencies in the form of electricity
supply shortages or higher rates as a result of a non-optimal generation mix.
3. Dynamic Inefficiency
The third major complaint with RBR is that it can interfere with the
optimal rate of technological change in the regulated industry.72 The primary
source of the problem is regulatory lag that introduces significant delays into
decisions which can affect growth.
4. Excessive Regulatory Costs
The fourth major complaint with RBR is that it is expensive to
administer. RBR's direct costs include both the firm's compliance costs and
68. H. Averch & L. L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52
AM. ECON. REV. 1053 (1962). See also W. Baumol & A. Klevorick, Input Choices and Rate of
Return Regulation, 1 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 162 (1970).
69. The empirical literature is mixed with regard to the presence of the AJ effect. For a
review and extension, see FREDERIC H. MURPHY & ALLEN L. SOYSTER, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES, Chapter 4 (1983).
70. For discussion of the reverse AJ effect, see PETER NAVARRO, THE DIMMING OF
AMERICA 15-16 (1985).
71. For discussion of the "O+M Squeeze," see id. at 61-63.
72. For a discussion of this problem, see C.F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE ECONOMICS OF




the regulatory commission's operations budget. In addition, there are
opportunity costs associated with the intensive use of legal and other resources
in the regulatory sector.7" Hence, one goal of PBR is to simplify the process
and thereby reduce these administrative, compliance, and opportunity costs.
B. RBR and the End of Monopoly
The rationales for PBR which we have looked at thus far have all
assumed that the electricity sector's monopoly status will continue. Some
scholars disagree with this assumption and propose PBR for an entirely
separate reason. They cite rapid technological change and increasing
competition in formerly monopolistic industrial sectors and sub-sectors such
as telecommunications and electricity generation as evidence that these
industries are no longer natural monopolies. They see PBR not as a long-term
solution, but rather as a short-term bridge between traditional RBR and a more
radical and complete deregulation.74
In the telecommunications industry, for example, wireless technologies
now promise to obliterate the economies of density arguments not only for
traditional plug-in phone service but also for cable TV as well.75 Similarly,
it has been argued that advances in cogeneration and alternative technologies
such as photovoltaics have introduced significant competition into the electricity
generation market. Such competition has been spurred by the Public Utilities
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA")76 and the National Energy
Policy Act of 1992 ("NEPA"). 77 PURPA has given rise to a new industry
in independently owned "qualifying facilities" that now compete with utilities
in the electricity generation market, while NEPA has given federal regulators
73. A discussion of the concept of opportunity cost can be found in any introductory
microeconomics textbook. See, e.g., BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 50, at 6-7.
74. The use of PBR as a bridge to deregulation is not universally accepted. Former FERC
Commissioner Branko Terzic, for example, has made clear that he does not believe that incentive
rates "are the bridge to competitive market prices." He thinks that "they are the bridge to efficient
monopoly operation." Cano, supra note 5, at 2.
75. A natural monopoly may arise from either economies of scale or economies of density.
For example, the traditional argument that electricity generation is a natural monopoly hinges on
the assumption that the unit costs of generation decrease steadily as plant size increases. Similarly,
in industries like cable television and residential telephone service, the economies of density
argument is the motivator: per unit costs decrease with density of hookups. Other arguments
include economies of scope and vertical integration.
76. Pub. L. Number 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 2601-2645
(1988)).
77. For a discussion of the opposing view (that the electricity generation market may not
yet be competitive), see Navarro, supra note 8; Gegax & Nowotny, supra note 8.
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the power to open transmission lines to competing electricity generators.78
III. PBR Mechanics
The policy question examined in this Article is whether PBR is likely to
improve the performance of current RBR regulation or whether it will, as its
detractors predict, be simply "a luxury trip to nowhere, at the ratepayers'
expense. 79 To answer this question, it is useful to discuss the mechanics of
PBR as well as its potential pitfalls.
As outlined in Table II, PBR is an evolutionary, as opposed to
revolutionary, approach to traditional RBR that involves three basic steps:
Table II. Mechanics of PBR
(1) Establish a baseline revenue requirement:
* Allow for inflationary, productivity, and other
adjustments to the baseline over time.
(2) Provide utility managers with an incentive to beat the
moving baseline:
* Design a sharing mechanism to distribute cost
savings.
(3) Incorporate a quality control mechanism:
* Insure cost savings are not achieved at the expense of
safety, reliability, or some other quality parameter.
First, the PBR regulator must set a starting point or "baseline" revenue
requirement to begin the experiment. In doing so, it must also adjust the
baseline upwards for inflation and downwards for projected productivity
increases. Second, the PBR regulator must provide utility managers with a
package of incentives to encourage these managers to produce at a cost below
this baseline. Operationally, this means the PBR regulator must design a
78. For an overview, see Jeffrey D. Watkiss and Douglas W. Smith, The Energy Policy
Act of 1992-A Watershed for Competition in the Wholesale Power Market, 10 YALE J. ON REG.
447, 452-54.
79. UCAN's Evaluation, supra note 35, at 1.
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sharing mechanism to distribute any realized cost savings between ratepayers
and shareholders in a way which preserves the incentive of managers to pursue
such savings while also meeting the regulator's goals of an equitable
distribution and increased economic competitiveness. Third, the PBR regulator
must include some type of "quality control" to insure that the utility does not
pursue cost savings at the expense of system reliability, safety, customer
satisfaction, and other measures of quality.
In taking these three steps, the PBR regulator faces several major
potential pitfalls. These pitfalls are outlined in Table III.
Table III. Potential Pitfalls of PBR
(1) Baseline "Too High" (Bogus Cost Savings)
(2) Baseline "Too Low" (Reverse AJ Effect
or "O+M Squeeze")
(3) Wrong Sharing Mechanism (Failure to Achieve
Maximum Cost Savings)
(4) Wrong Quality Mechanism (Reduction in Some
Measures of Service Quality)
First, the baseline revenue requirement must not be set too high or too
low. If it is set too high, i.e., above the observed ACob,, the result will be
bogus accounting cost savings rather than real savings. If the baseline is set
too low, i.e., below the minimum ACn, the baseline will simply be punitive.
This could result in a "Reverse AJ Effect," which would involve an under-
investment of capital, or an "O+M Squeeze," which would involve the
deferment of necessary operations and maintenance expenses. Second, the
sharing mechanism must encourage the utility to pursue the maximum
achievable cost savings rather than simply allowing the utility to reap the lion's
share of the most easily achieved cost savings without pursuing the more
difficult cost savings. Third, there must be a reasonable conditionality or
linkage between the penalty system for quality deterioration and the reward
system established by the sharing mechanism. In this regard-and this caveat
is included only because the California PUC has already chosen to ignore
it0-the PBR system must not include any additional alleged "incentives"
80. As discussed earlier, California's PBR regulators included a national price index as
part of their incentive system that arguably is inappropriate.
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which, in reality have little or no relationship to the utility's strategic behavior.
A. The Baseline Revenue Requirement in Theory
Recall from Figure Two that the optimal price and quantity combination
under efficient rate base regulation occurs at point B where price equals
average cost on the firm's minimum cost curve, ACm,,. Clearly, this point
should be the regulator's desired ending point or target goal under PBR. Also
recall that under inefficient regulation, price is set to point A on the firm's
observed cost curve (ACob,) because the regulator cannot determine the firm's
minimum AC and the firm will not reveal it.
The task of the PBR regulator is to set some baseline starting point
relative to point A and then to design a set of incentives so that over the course
of the ratemaking period, the PBR ending point moves as close to point B as
possible. It is useful at this point to explore five different PBR scenarios and
their associated starting and ending points."1 Assume a simple one-period
model in which the PBR regulator establishes a baseline at time t and adjusts
the baseline over the length of the period for inflation, productivity, and other
factors.8 2 Figure Three traces four possible average cost curves and five
possible scenarios associated with this model.
As in Figure Two, curves ACm, and ACob. in Figure Three represent the
minimum cost curve under efficient regulation and the observed cost curve
under RBR, respectively. In addition, a "bloated" cost curve ACb, lies above
ACob,. Finally, a "rate suppression" cost curve ACr, lies below ACmm.
1. The Best Case
In the "Best Case" scenario, the omniscient PBR regulator successfully
determines the firm's minimum AC at the beginning of the period and sets the
baseline at point B. The utility is forced to minimize its costs and move from
its observed ACob, without any added PBR incentives.
This theoretical scenario is rendered impossible in the real world by
incomplete information and strategic behavior by utility managers with regard
to revealing the necessary information. Indeed, if this "impossible dream"
were possible, it would be equally possible under RBR and there would be no
need for PBR. The scenario is presented only as a reference point.
81. While there are numerous combinations of outcomes, these five basic scenarios
essentially bracket the possibilities.





2. The Second Best Case
In the PBR regulator's "Second Best Case" scenario, the regulatory game
determining the baseline revenue requirement continues much as it has under
a traditional RBR proceeding. A baseline rate of Pob, is set at point A where
Pob,=ACob,. Over the course of the PBR period, the PBR incentive system
guides the utility to point B where Pmi.=ACmm,. In this scenario, all possible
cost savings under an average cost pricing rule are attained and output
increases, although the beneficiaries of the cost savings are yet to be
determined.
3. Bogus Cost Savings
In the PBR regulator's "Bogus Cost Savings" scenario, utility managers
use their political clout and/or their advantage in asymmetric information to
successfully "game" the system." The result is a bloated baseline set too high
at ACblt. The initial price or rate is set at Pblt = ACblt, point C in Figure Three.
In the more benign variation of this scenario, the utility responds weakly to
PBR's incentives during the experiment and moves from point C to point A.
The result is "paper" or bogus accounting cost savings rather than the real
ones associated with moving to point B.
4. The Worst Case
In the "Worst Case" variation of the PBR regulator's Bogus Cost Savings
Scenario, utility managers totally ignore PBR's incentives and simply choose
the quiet life. They operate at point C at a price of Pb, with a cost structure
even more bloated than it had to begin with and an even lower output.84
5. Rate Suppression
Finally, in the "Rate Suppression" scenario the PBR regulator sets the
baseline below the firm's minimum AC and the price at point D. 5 This forces
the utility to scramble to cut costs and operate efficiently. Eventually, however,
83. For discussions of the game aspects of the regulatory environment, see WILLIAM T.
GORMLEY, JR., THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1983). See also DOUGLAS D.
ANDERSON, REGULATORY POLITICS AND ELECTRIC UTILITIES (1981).
84. Fortunately, there is no reason to expect, a priori, that any utility would be more
successful at this under PBR than under a traditional RBR framework.
85. This could happen under intense pressure, for example, from ratepayer groups that,
for whatever reason, have gained the upper hand in the ongoing political struggle with the utility.
For a general discussion of the concept of rate suppression and its political origins, see Navarro,
supra note 70.
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because point D is below ACm,, managers will face a short run choice of
either cutting the shareholders' realized rate of return or adopting an "O+M
Squeeze" strategy of deferring maintenance and cutting costs beyond what
efficiency and quality concerns would dictate.16
B. The Baseline Revenue Requirement in Practice
From the five scenarios described above, it should be clear that setting
the baseline correctly is absolutely critical to the success of PBR. If this
baseline is set too high (point C) or too low (point D), the experiment will be
doomed to failure. These scenarios also shed light on the first paradox of the
PBR experiment, which is that in setting the baseline revenue requirement
under PBR, the regulator faces the same problems of gamesmanship,
incomplete information and cost revelation that it faced under RBR. In coping
with these problems, the PBR regulator may use the same methodology it has
historically used in the RBR process to set the baseline, use a newly emerging
"statistical benchmark model" approach, or apply some combination of the two
methods.
1. Traditional RBR Ratemaking
Using option one, the traditional methodology, the baseline will be set
in exactly the same way that the revenue requirement is set in an RBR
proceeding according to the formula in Equations 1 and 2 above. Specifically,
the utility will provide estimates of its cost of capital and capital expansion
plans to aid in the determination of the rate base. It will provide historical data
and projected estimates of its variable operating costs and propose indices to
adjust for inflation, such as the Producers Price Index. It will provide
adjustments for productivity to offset inflation, and it will provide a demand
forecast by which the revenue requirement shall be divided to arrive at a rate
or price. Finally, it will propose pass-through clauses and a set of exclusions
to the system.
In reviewing all this material, the PBR process will be subject to exactly
the same gaming behavior associated with RBR. Utility managers may try to
strategically inflate costs, and ratepayer advocates may strategically understate
costs. The regulatory outcome will be determined by a complex political
calculus involving the relative strengths of the competing interests, the
ideological orientation of the regulatory commissioners and bureaucrats, and
86. As a strategic matter during PBR proceedings, utility managers will typically try to
claim they are in a rate suppressive Scenario Five world while ratepayer advocates will be prone




the completeness and reliability of the available information.17
The good news for PBR advocates is that there is no a priori reason to
suggest that the baseline will be set at a more bloated level under PBR than
it is now set under straight RBR. However, it should be remembered that if
care is not taken in setting the initial baseline, PBR will not fulfill its cost-
cutting promises but rather will be nothing more than a reformist cloak for
unwarranted rate increases and continued X-inefficiency.
In order to lend empirical content to this discussion and illustrate the
problem of strategic gaming, it is useful to relate the above theoretical
discussion to the California PBR experiment. In filing its application, San
Diego Gas & Electric used its own firm-specific data and accompanying
econometric analysis to forecast its preferred baseline revenue requirement and
escalation factors. After reviewing SDG&E's data, the consumer advocacy
group UCAN argued that the SDG&E baseline was "too high""8 and that "the
starting point for the benchmark was inflated by at least $10 million."89
According to UCAN, "[s] etting the benchmark inaccurately means that either
SDG&E will have little incentive to cut costs or it will realize false cost
savings. "90
UCAN countered SDG&E's proposal with its own econometric analysis
that yielded a significantly lower baseline. It also called for the PUC to "order
an electric rate reduction of $20 million to take effect when the Base Rate
Mechanism is adopted to compensate for the high level of expenses approved
in 1993."'9 SDG&E branded UCAN's analysis as "illogical, incomplete, and
incorrect" 92 and lamented that "San Diego would start the era of performance-
based ratemaking needing to make up $30 million annually just to break
even. "3 Stripped of rhetoric, this battle over which econometric analysis is
more credible offers a typical example of the kind of strategic gaming that
regularly occurs in the regulatory arena between utilities and ratepayers.
Consider the following stylized interpretation of the events in this case. 94
Player One, SDG&E, argues that its baseline is reasonable, i.e., that it
87. For a theoretical and empirical analysis of this political calculus, see Peter Navarro,
Public Utility Commission Regulation: Performance, Determinants, and Energy Policy Impacts,
ENERGY J., Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 119.
88. UCAN's Opening Concurrent Brief, supra note 39, at 25.
89. Id. at 25.
90. Id. at 26.
91. UCAN's Evaluation, supra note 35, at 9.
92. Opening Brief of San Diego Gas & Electric Co. at ix, Application of San Diego Gas
& Electric Co. to Establish an Experimental Performance-Based Ratemaking Mechanism (Cal.
Pub. Util. Comm'n, February 24, 1994) (Application Number 92-10-017) (U 902-M).
93. San Diego Gas & Electric Co., Prepared Rebuttal Testimony, regarding Application
of San Diego Gas & Electric Co. to Establish an Experimental Performance-Based Ratemaking
Mechanism (January 12, 1994) (Application Number 92-10-017, Phase II).
94. This is a stylized version of the facts, not the actual arguments of the stakeholders.
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lies somewhere between minimum cost point B and its observed cost point A
in Figure Three. It further characterizes UCAN's baseline as rate suppressive
(perhaps as low as point D), warns of severe financial hardship, and threatens
to withdraw its PBR application if UCAN's baseline is approved. Player Two,
UCAN, counters that SDG&E wants to start at a bloated baseline, i.e., point
C in Figure Three.95 It believes that any cost savings that are achieved will
be bogus accounting cost savings rather than real cost savings, which properly
lie in the interval between points A and B in the Figure. UCAN further insists
that its own baseline is reasonable.
The PBR regulator must choose between these two competing
econometric interpretations. This is an extremely difficult task, particularly for
administrative law judges who have not been schooled in the arcane subject
of econometrics and who must work within the limitations of firm-specific
data.96 The typical regulatory solution is to "split the difference." This
practice creates incentives for each player in a recurring game to strategically
"high ball" or "low ball" its estimates, depending on its own interests.97
This stylized interpretation makes clear that PBR is indeed likely to be
subject to the same kind of gaming as traditional RBR if base rate calculations
are left to an ALJ However, an alternative method of calculating the
appropriate baseline known as "Statistical Benchmark Modeling" may offer
at least a partial way out of this strategic gaming trap.
2. The Promise of Statistical Benchmark Modeling
Recent advances in the application of econometric techniques to the utility
industry have given rise to a whole class of analytics called "Statistical
Benchmark Modeling" ("SBM"). 98 SBM represents a potentially cutting-edge
advancement in ascertaining the firm's true minimum cost curve. Accordingly,
SBM may be useful both in setting the initial baseline revenue requirement and
in providing the PBR regulator with a better estimate of the desired PBR end
point (point B at Pmm on the minimum cost curve ACm,,. in Figure Three).
95. UCAN in fact argued that "the Joint Proposal sets its revenue benchmark higher than
the company's current cost structure." UCAN's Opening Concurrent Brief, supra note 39, at 6.
96. As UCAN itself acknowledges: "[T]he nature of econometrics is such that it is not
easy to distinguish between well-specified and correctly estimated equations and poorly specified,
statistically weak equations." Id. at 26.
97. In this particular case, however, the administrative law judge chose to side with
SDG&E. In its decision, the AUJ found that, "while both proposals are reasonable, on balance
the Joint Proposal's equations have greater support in the record because they were developed
using more data points . . . ." AU Decision, supra note 32, at 58.
98. See ECONOMIC SCIENCES CORP., PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: CALIFORNIA INVESTOR-
OWNED UTmiEs, CONSUMER ALLIANCE FOR ELECTRIC RATE REDUCTIONS (May 1994) (statistical





To see how SBM works, it is useful to contrast it with the approach in
a traditional RBR proceeding. Under RBR, the basic unit of measure is the
firm itself, or perhaps a small cluster of firms operating within the regulatory
jurisdiction.99 When San Diego Gas & Electric files a General Rate Case
application, for example, it presents firm-specific data to the California
PUC.' ° Typically, it provides both historical and forecast data on elements
of the rate base as well as the variable operating costs associated with factors
such as fuel and labor. The purpose of the data is to estimate future costs based
on past history. In this sense, the utility's revenue requirement is prepared in
a "vacuum" devoid of information about other utilities. Accordingly, this
approach provides no reference point to determine whether the utility's costs
are reasonable, i.e., whether the utility is close to operating on its minimum
cost curve.10'
In contrast, the Statistical Benchmark Modeling approach typically
examines a utility's cost structure within the context of a much wider sample
of utilities."0 2 SBM normalizes this utility's data relative to the sample group
by adjusting for geography, weather, fuel mix, and other operating conditions
and characteristics. By applying this normalized data to specific firms, SBM
can do a potentially better job of revealing a firm's true minimum cost
curve. 103
a. The SBM Methodology
SBM starts with the presumption that the economically efficient minimum
cost curve (AC,, in Figure Three) is directly unobservable for any specific
utility. SBM also presumes that each utility has a different efficiency frontier
based on its own unique production, transmission, and distribution
characteristics.'" 4 Because these characteristics vary from utility to utility,
99. On occasion, the data of a small cluster of other regulated firms within the jurisdiction
may also be used as a reference point or benchmark.
100. While the PUC and intervenors may also use for comparison the capital and operating
characteristics for Pacific Gas & Electric and Southern California Edison, the other two major
utilities in its jurisdiction, final determination of rates is largely driven by the Commission's
analysis of the SDG&E data.
101. By the California PUC's own admission, "There has never been such a
comprehensive benchmarking analysis presented in any California PUC proceeding." DIv. OF
RATEPAYER ADVOCATES, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, supra note 1, at 1-4.
102. In its benchmarking analysis of three California utilities, Economic Sciences
Corporation used a model that included the operating statistics of the top 100 utilities in the
country. See ECONOMIC SCIENCES CORP., supra note 98.
103. To date, utilities have responded in an extremely negative manner to the use of
Statistical Benchmark Modeling. See, e.g., Southern California Edison Company, Southern
California Edison Company's Evaluation and Response to the CAERR Study (Sept., 1994)
(testimony before California PUC regarding Application Number 93-12-029).
104. ECONOMIC SCIENCES CORP., supra note 99, at 2.
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it is inherently difficult to compare the true efficiencies of different utilities
without running into an "apples and oranges" problem.
One utility, for example, may operate in a jurisdiction where the average
annual temperature is 40 degrees Fahrenheit (and residential electricity bills
are relatively high), where the utility is close to cheap reserves of coal, where
environmental pollution regulations are lax, where there is a large industrial
base (and lower fixed distribution costs), where taxes are high, and where
average hourly wages are relatively low. In this jurisdiction, electricity usage
and taxes are relatively high, but fuel, labor, and regulatory compliance costs
are relatively low.
In contrast, another utility may operate in the Sunbelt with an average
temperature of 70 degrees (and low residential electricity bills), expensive
petroleum as a major fuel source, stringent air pollution laws, a small
industrial base, low taxes, and high wages. In this jurisdiction, electricity usage
is relatively low, but labor, fuel, and regulatory costs are relatively high.
To address this problem, the SBM model establishes a "comparison
group" of utilities. The idea is to isolate those cost components such as power
plant efficiencies over which the utility management has direct control from
other components such as weather and regulatory climate that it does not.
Using econometric techniques, SBM can then normalize the various
geographic, demographic, fuel mix, and other variables. As Berndt, Doane,
and Epstein explain:
In the case of electricity, differences in regional, economic,
and regulatory factors influence system-average rates independent
of management. Regression analysis yields rate comparisons that
control for these differences. Given data describing a national
sample of utilities, this method can be applied to answer the
following question: If the sample utilities faced the same regional,
economic, and regulatory conditions as the utility under
investigation, what rate, on average, would they charge ? Systematic
differences, if any, between the average rate for the utility and the
national sample that cannot be explained on the basis of specified
factors can be attributed to the residual performance of management
and/or the omission of a relevant factor(s) from the analysis."0 5
The SBM model has its roots in a 1990 study performed by George
Tolley and Edward Bodmer. The authors used a regression model to estimate
and adjust for specific factors that influenced rates in different areas. Tolly and
105. Ernst Berndt et al., Electric Utility Rates and the Evaluation of Management
Performance, ELECTRICITY J., Aug.-Sept. 1995, at 71.
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Bodmer concluded that "electric rate differentials are largely explained by costs
inherent in serving a particular geographical area and by timing anomalies
which arise from the way utility companies are regulated." "
In their study, Tolley and Bodmer used at least 15 different variables to
differentiate rates. These variables ranged from customer characteristics such
as load factor and industrial sales percentage and regulatory variables such as
rate of return, regional business costs, state and local taxes per kilowatt hour,
service territory density, and line loss percentages.
More recently, Economic Sciences Corporation ("ESC") updated the
Tolley and Bodmer model to examine the rate performance of California's
three largest utilities, San Diego Gas & Electric, Pacific Gas & Electric
("PG&E"), and Southern California Edison ("Edison"). In its study, ESC
gathered data on 100 of the largest electric utilities for customer
characteristics, power source characteristics, fuel cost and plant characteristics,
labor cost, state and local taxes, and general productivity.
This rate model was simulated to yield "standard average rates" ("SAR")
estimates for each of the 100 utilities. These utilities were then ranked
according to the size of the difference between the actual observed SARs and
the SARs predicted by the model. A negative difference or "residual" indicated
that the utility out-performed the model's predictions regarding its rate
efficiency. In contrast, a positive residual indicated the utility under-performed
against the model.107
b. The Califomia PBR Experiment-SBM
Using the above methodology, ESC found that the subject of our case
study, SDG&E, ranked 65th out of the sample of 100 utilities. Within the
context of our analysis, this would suggest that SDG&E was operating very
inefficiently, i.e., closer to point C on the bloated cost curve in Figure Three
than 64 other utilities examined. ESC also found two other California utilities,
PG&E and Edison, to rank 98th and 100th, respectively.
During the PBR proceeding, UCAN suggested that the Commission
consider the use of SBM to help set the baseline revenue requirement, but the
Commission declined. In a subsequent hearing in which Edison applied for its
own PBR, the Commission had another chance to use SBM.
In that hearing, ESC presented the aforementioned statistical results in
which Edison ranked dead last in performance. Edison countered that ESC had
omitted or misspecified many variables in its regression equations and accused
106. George S. Tolley & Edward C. Bodmer, Utility Rate Comparisons and Management
Efficiency, PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, Jan. 4, 1990, at 29.
107. ECONOMIC SCIENCES CORP., supra note 98, at 6.
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ESC of "sloppy" and "partisan" research.' It also charged that ESC had
strategically dropped six utilities from the original sample and had passed over
eleven other utilities in selecting the six substitutes. The clear implication of
Edison's critique is that ESC had "cooked the books" on behalf of its client,
a coalition of electricity consumer groups with a strategic agenda of "low
balling" Edison's rates.'0 9
It is not the purpose of this Article to resolve this dispute. Whether or
not Edison was correct in its accusations against ESC, however, the
accusations themselves highlight a perennial problem in the regulatory arena:
the potential manipulation of statistical methods and data for the purpose of
strategically gaming a regulatory outcome. Whether in a traditional RBR
hearing or a "reformist" PBR hearing, regulators must be ever vigilant against
such manipulation and do their best to find an "honest broker" who will use
the appropriate methods in a careful and rigorous manner.
Properly applied, however, Statistical Benchmark Modeling is a
potentially useful tool in a PBR proceeding both as an independent check on
the traditional, firm-specific method of determining the baseline revenue
requirement and as a guidepost to the target ending point of the PBR
experiment. "0
C. The Sharing Mechanism
The second major component of PBR is a sharing mechanism that
distributes any realized cost savings between ratepayers and shareholders.
Proper design of a PBR sharing mechanism involves both equity and efficiency
considerations as well as a consideration of the broader goal of promoting the
economic competitiveness of utility customers.
As noted in Figure Two, the basic efficiency goal of the sharing
mechanism is to provide the utility with an incentive to move from the starting
point baseline of point A on the observed cost curve, ACob,, as swiftly as
possible to the ending point B and P.,, on the minimum cost curve, ACi.
The PBR regulator faces a basic tradeoff which represents the second
paradox of PBR: while the best way to insure that maximum cost savings are
realized is to simply give the utility 100 percent of all such savings, such a
distribution defeats the basic goal of reducing the costs for utility customers
and enhancing their economic competitiveness. This is illustrated in Figure
Four, which depicts the "supply" and "demand" curves for cost savings, as
108. Southern California Edison Company, supra note 104, at 1-2.
109. See Id.
110. The application of SBM techniques need not be limited to the PBR arena. Such
techniques can also help solve the cost revelation problem in any traditional RBR proceeding.
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viewed from the utility's perspective." 1
The vertical axis measures the utility share of cost savings by percent.
At zero percent, all cost savings accrue to the ratepayer while at one hundred
percent, all cost savings accrue to shareholders. The horizontal axis measures
the number of basis points the utility earns over its allowed baseline rate of
return ("ROR") and for illustrative purposes ranges from zero to 400. Thus,
if the utility's allowed baseline ROR is 12 percent under PBR and it pursues
cost savings such that it actually earns a return of 14 percent, the cost savings
will be 200 basis points.
Two alternative "supply curves" for cost savings are depicted in Figure
Four, S. and S,. These curves are similar to other supply curves in
economics and their upward slopes reflect an underlying assumption of
increasing marginal costs, implying that the utility will find each additional
increment of cost savings more expensive to achieve than the last.
The slopes of S., and S,,. also reflect the relative abundance of, and cost
of achieving, potential cost savings. S.,, the "abundant cost savings" option,
has a relatively flatter slope than S,, and lies to the right of S.. It represents
the case in which cost savings are both relatively abundant and inexpensive
to achieve. In contrast, the slope of S., the "scarce cost savings" curve, is
much steeper and lies to the left of S.,. In this case, potential cost savings are
both relatively scarce and expensive to achieve.
On the demand side, Figure Four depicts four possible "demand curves"
for savings associated with different sharing arrangements. D100 represents
the case where shareholders receive 100 percent of all cost savings, D75
represents a 75/25 percent split for shareholders and ratepayers, D50 a 50/50
split, and so on." 2
Under the neo-classical assumption that the profit maximizing utility will
pursue cost savings up to the point at which the marginal benefit to
shareholders equals the marginal cost of achieving the cost savings, equilibrium
in this PBR "market for cost savings" will occur at the intersection of supply,
which reflects marginal cost, and demand, which reflects the utility's marginal
revenue.
For example, at a utility share of 100 percent, equilibrium occurs at point
D on the S,,, curve with savings of roughly 70 basis points or at point H on
the S., with savings of 400 basis points. Similarly, at a utility share of 75
111. The figure depicts gross, rather than net after-tax, cost savings. In doing so, it
assumes away the negative impact that the corporate tax will have on utility incentives to engage
in cost savings by lowering the net reward. However, adding tax considerations is a needless
complication that does not change the overall point or basic analysis, namely, that a progressive
sharing mechanism provides a greater reward as the level of cost savings rises so that it encourages
maximum cost savings while a regressive mechanism discourages savings.
112. Each of these demand curves is horizontal because benefits are defined in terms of
a constant percentage of the available basis point savings.
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percent, equilibrium occurs either at point C or at point G, respectively.
From the Figure, two points are obvious. First, the amount of cost
savings follows an upward progression with regard to utility share regardless
of whether cost savings are relatively scarce or abundant. That is, the higher
the share of cost savings that accrue to the utility, the greater the cost savings
it will pursue. This suggests that in general, as we shall demonstrate below,
a "progressive" sharing mechanism in which the utility's share increases with
the amount of cost savings achieved will be preferred to a "regressive"
mechanism in which the utility's share falls as cost savings rise.
Second, as noted above, maximum cost-effective savings will be achieved
when the utility's share is 100 percent, either at point H when cost savings are
relatively abundant, or at point D when they are not. Note, however, that
giving utility shareholders all of the cost savings defeats at least two other
goals of PBR: an equitable sharing of benefits with ratepayers and, perhaps
most importantly, improving the economic competitiveness of utility customers
and their own customer base.113
The important policy question, then, is this: what type of sharing
mechanism best reconciles these tradeoffs between efficiency and equity, and
between maximum cost savings and economic competitiveness? As we shall
see below, answering this question is far easier in a one-period model in which
the utility participates in the PBR experiment and then is deregulated than it
is in a multi-period framework in which the utility remains under regulation
indefinitely. However, we shall first see that in most cases a progressive
sharing arrangement will be preferred to a regressive one.
1. A Progressive Versus a Regressive Sharing Mechanism
As shown in Figure Four, in a world of perfect information in which the
supply curve for cost savings is known, the optimal PBR sharing mechanism
is one in which the "perfectly discriminating" PBR regulator sets a
progressively increasing share for the utility that perfectly tracks upward along
the S., curve, much like the perfectly discriminating monopolist tracks
downward along the demand curve in setting price.114
Under such a scheme, the utility's marginal share of the cost savings
would always equal its marginal cost, and the utility's share would steadily
increase along the vertical axis until its share of the cost savings reached 100
percent exactly at the desired equilibrium point D or H. Under such a scheme,
113. This point is demonstrated in Navarro, The U.S. Regulatory Environment, supra note
12. Using input-output tables for the U.S., Navarro also demonstrates how electricity price shocks
from the regulatory arena can ripple through an entire domestic economy with significant
implications for trade and economic competitiveness.
114. See, e.g., EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMIcs 316-17 (1994).
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both utility cost savings and the ratepayer's share of these cost savings are
maximized.
The obvious implementation problem, however, is that in a world of
incomplete information, the precise savings cost curve is unknown. At the
same time, in a world of transaction costs such a complex scheme may be
expensive to administer. It follows that a multi-tiered progressive mechanism
may be a more practical compromise for the PBR regulator. Such a mechanism
is illustrated in Figure Five and then contrasted with a multi-tiered regressive
sharing mechanism in Figure Six.
a. A Multi-Tiered Progressive Sharing Mechanism
In Figure Five, the progressive, multi-tiered sharing mechanism rewards
the utility with 25 percent of the first 100 basis points of cost savings, 50
percent of the next 100 basis points, 75 percent of the next 100 basis points
and 100 percent thereafter. This mechanism is embodied in the "ascending
staircase" demand curve Dpg where the solid portions of the staircase curve
trace the utility's share of the cost savings.
In Figure Five, equilibrium occurs at precisely the same point that it did
in Figure Four for the abundant cost savings option, namely at point H where
Dpg intersects Sn,. As in Figure Four, maximum cost-effective cost savings are
achieved.
However, unlike in Figure Four where ratepayers got nothing, ratepayers
now enjoy a substantial portion of the savings. This share is equal to the area
of the polygon beginning at 25 percent on the vertical axis, moving through
points A, I, J, K, L, M, and N, and then back over to 100 percent on the
vertical axis. Thus, both equity and efficiency goals are advanced as well as
the goal of increased economic competitiveness.
Note, however, that regulatory efficiency in the scarce cost savings
equilibrium does not fare nearly as well. Under these conditions, equilibrium
occurs at point A in Figure Five which is lower than the achieved equilibrium
point D in Figure Four. Nonetheless, because of the steep slope of S,.,,
relatively small potential cost savings are foregone (70 minus 30 basis points
as measured along the vertical axis).
b. A Multi-Tiered Regressive Sharing Mechanism
By way of contrast, Figure Six illustrates a regressive sharing mechanism
in which the utility gets 100 percent of the first 100 basis points, 75 percent
of the second 100, 50 percent of the third 100 basis points, and 25 percent of
the points thereafter. This mechanism is embodied in Figure Six as the
"descending staircase" demand curve Drg where the solid portions of the curve
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once again trace the utility's share of the savings.
In the abundant cost savings option, utility managers stop reducing costs
at point F, well before point H, the result under a progressive retention
system. This illustrates the major danger of a regressive sharing mechanism:
it is much more likely to result in "cream skimming" of the easiest cost
savings with no attempt at achieving relatively difficult cost savings. Having
said this, it is nonetheless true that the regressive sharing mechanism
outperforms the progressive mechanism in the scarce cost savings scenario.
Equilibrium occurs at point D, as opposed to point A in Figure Five, and
maximum cost savings are achieved.
Note, however, that this scarce savings scenario runs contrary to the
basic premise of PBR, namely that traditional RBR has bred a bloated,
inefficient cost structure. Moreover, even if we assume that potential cost
savings are scarce, the regressive mechanism fails to increase economic
competitiveness, a major goal of PBR. In this case, the only benefit of PBR
is a small reduction of deadweight loss with no compensation to the ratepayer
and a small reward to shareholders.
Putting this sharing mechanism debate in perspective, if PBR regulators
truly believe that potential cost savings are small and potential rate reductions
are negligible, there really is no point in embarking upon an admittedly
speculative PBR experiment. On the other hand, if PBR regulators truly believe
that utility cost structures are bloated, a regressive sharing mechanism is
unambiguously undesirable and a progressive sharing mechanism will always
be preferred."5
2. The Sharing Mechanism Under Shareholder Losses
The final important issue faced by the PBR regulator is what to do if a
utility incurs losses rather than achieving cost savings during the PBR period.
This question is easy to answer under the PBR assumption that the regulated
firm is operating on an observed AC well above the minimum AC. Under this
assumption, utility shareholders should be given no further incentive to operate
inefficiently. Shareholders should therefore absorb 100 percent of all losses.
3. The California PBR Experiment
In its application, SDG&E argued for a regressive sharing mechanism
that featured 100 percent of savings to shareholders for the first 100 basis
115. It can easily be shown that the more tiers in the progressive schedule, the greater
the probability the utility will continue to pursue all cost savings up to the efficient point. At the
limit, a PBR mechanism with infinite tiers will be perfectly discriminating.
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points above the company's authorized rate of return, 75 percent of savings
between 100 and 150 basis points, and 50 percent above 150 basis points." 6
In contrast, UCAN proposed a progressive sharing mechanism in which
shareholders would receive 30 percent of the cost savings up to 50 basis points
above the benchmark, 50 percent between 50 and 200 basis points, and 70
percent of the savings above 200 basis points."'
In arguing for the use of a regressive sharing mechanism, SDG&E stated
that "the greatest economic efficiency is gained through an allocation of all
savings representing efficiency gains to shareholders." Acknowledging that this
was not a "practical approach," SDG&E opted for 100 percent of the first 100
basis points and stated that "it provides substantial incentives to the utility to
effect savings." SDG&E further argued that the regressive sharing mechanism
provided its shareholders with "a balance and a safeguard.""s
UCAN countered that "a mechanism which gives the utility all of the first
dollars saved and fifty percent of the dollars beyond a benchmark will
encourage the utility to save as many of the first dollars as possible and
discourage saving the more difficult ones.
" 119
In accepting SDG&E's arguments, the Administrative Law Judge argued
that "any sharing with ratepayers is a departure from current regulation."120
More importantly, the ALJ also seemed to accept the view implicit in
SDG&E's argument that there may not be substantial savings for the utility
to pursue. 2' Within the context of the theoretical framework we have
outlined above, the ALJ's perspective is consistent with a world of "scarce cost
savings" as represented by the savings supply curve S,,, in Figure Four. In
contrast, UCAN implicitly believes that SDG&E is in a world more consistent
with S, which represents the case in which cost savings are both relatively
abundant and inexpensive to achieve.
Based on the first year results of PBR, it is impossible to unequivocally
determine whether SDG&E and the ALJ or UCAN are right. All we know thus
far is that SDG&E achieved 114 basis points of savings above the
benchmark. 22 This figure may represent the full extent of SDG&E's
potential cost savings. On the other hand, it may well be that under UCAN's
progressive sharing mechanism, SDG&E might have achieved as many as 200
or more basis points of savings.
116. Joint Testimony, supra note 34, at 15.
117. UCAN's Evaluation, supra note 35, at 3.
118. Opening Brief of San Diego Gas & Electric, supra note 93, at 45.
119. UCAN's Evaluation, supra note 35, at 20.
120. AU Decision, supra note 32, at 64.
121. For example, the AI writes that "the theory that SDG&E can be spurred to achieve
large savings . . . is not supported by the empirical evidence regarding SDG&E's operations and
costs." Id. at 65.
122. SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC, supra note 45.
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In light of this unresolved controversy, it is perhaps worth restating a
point made above: if the PBR regulator (in this case, the ALJ) truly believes
that potential cost savings are small and potential rate reductions are negligible,
there really is no point in embarking upon an admittedly speculative PBR
experiment. On the other hand, if the PBR regulator truly believes that utility
cost structures are bloated, a regressive sharing mechanism is unambiguously
undesirable and a progressive sharing mechanism will always be preferred.
D. The Quality Control Mechanism
The third major component of PBR is a quality control mechanism that
establishes a clear linkage between utility cost savings and various measures
of utility performance.
The potential problem here should be obvious: in order to "beat" the
moving baseline and cream rewards from the sharing mechanism, the utility
may be tempted to achieve false cost savings by deferring necessary
maintenance, reducing service personnel, or engaging in some other type of
cost cutting that reduces some measure of performance. The equally obvious
solution to this problem is to devise a system that penalizes utilities in such
a way as to directly link the sharing of cost savings to the maintenance of
quality standards.
It must be stressed here that the quality control mechanism should be a
penalty system only, not a reward system as well. From a mathematical
optimization point of view, the objective of the PBR regulator is to insure that
the utility minimizes costs subject to the maintenance of certain quality
constraints. From this perspective, cost cutting under PBR is rewarded through
the sharing mechanism while violations of the quality constraint are punished
through the quality control mechanism. Viewed from this perspective, there
is no need to offer the utility any reward for maintaining quality.
In designing this third component of the PBR system, the regulator must:
(1) determine what measures of quality to include in the system; (2) set
thresholds or floors for each of the quality parameters; and (3) establish a
system of penalties for violations of the quality constraints.
1. Determining Quality Parameters
The relevant quality parameters should include, but not be limited to,
system reliability, customer service, and employee safety. Each of these
parameters is regularly measured by utilities and is therefore easy to monitor.
One common measure of system reliability in the electricity industry, for
example, is the "average number of customer interruption minutes." Employee
safety, in turn, can be measured by the accident rate. Similarly, customer
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satisfaction is typically measured, albeit less precisely, through the use of
annual customer surveys for areas such as Field Service and Meter Reading,
Local Office, Telephone Center, Service Planning, and Energy Services.
This discussion leads to the third PBR paradox: while the various quality
parameters may be easy to measure, they are difficult to value. For example,
what is the dollar value of a five percent decrease in service reliability or
customer satisfaction? As discussed below, this valuation problem poses a
significant implementation hurdle for the PBR regulator both in terms of setting
thresholds and assessing penalties.
2. Setting Quality Thresholds
Establishing thresholds for each of the quality parameters is an important
regulatory function with significant political implications. In this regard, the
PBR regulator may be tempted to simply peg quality at its existing level. These
levels may not be optimal, however. Under cost-based PBR the utility may
have padded its service force, for example, leading to the provision of
excessive service. Alternatively, it may have over-built its generation system
beyond a reasonable reliability standard. However, if the PBR regulator
volitionally cuts levels of target quality, he or she runs the risk of political
criticism when customer satisfaction falls or system interruptions increase. The
point here is simple: there is an interaction between a bloated observed average
cost curve (ACbt) and existing levels of quality that the PBR regulator should
be mindful of when approaching the quality threshold issue.
Threshold levels pose a significant analytical problem because while
kilowatts of electricity or cubic feet of gas are assigned dollar values in the
market place, other non-price dimensions of performance like service and
safety are not. This problem is discussed in more detail in the next sub-section
within the broader context of the economics of assessing penalties.
3. Assessing Penalties
In theory, the optimal penalty system is straightforward: the profit
maximizing utility will cut costs at the expense of quality up to the point where
the marginal gains from cutting costs are equal to the marginal losses from the
penalties of reducing quality.' 23 Recognizing this calculus, the PBR regulator
must devise a system of penalties that insures that the marginal penalty from
reducing quality below the quality floor is always greater than the utility's
marginal benefit.
123. This assumes there are no external costs associated with reduction in quality such
as loss of customers.
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This, of course, is easier said than done. In order to implement such a
system, one must first assign dollar values to changes in the various quality
parameters. The problem, however, is that non-price performance indicators
such as customer service and employee safety share the same characteristics
as non-marketed public goods: they are difficult to value precisely because they
are not assigned any explicit prices in the market place.' 24
Again, in theory, it is feasible to estimate a valuation schedule for
changes in quality using methodologies such as contingent valuation or hedonic
pricing, for example." z From such data, it would be possible to calculate
penalties to reflect sound marginal cost pricing economics, i.e., the penalty
or "price" of violating the quality constraint should be set above the utility's
marginal cost of violating it.
However, in practice, contingent valuation and other such studies are
very expensive to conduct and would defeat one of the other goals of PBR:
to reduce regulatory and administrative costs. With these difficulties in mind,
it is nonetheless possible to discuss some rules of thumb to help guide PBR
regulators.
The easiest and toughest rule would be to deny the utility its share of cost
savings should any quality parameter be breached. Under such a rule, the
quality threshold is inviolable. The danger here is that such a rule would
discourage risk-taking on the part of utility managers and would likely lead
to a non-optimal "quality cushion" well above the quality threshold.
A second, more flexible approach is to assess the penalty as some
fraction of the cost savings that increases as quality falls. If one accepts the
intuitive notion of increasing marginal costs to the ratepayer of lowered
quality, then it follows that the "penalty fraction" should rise as quality falls
further below the quality floor. As with the sharing mechanism, for
administrative simplicity the fraction may be multi-tiered rather than
continuous.
Regardless of the method used to assess penalties, the most important rule
is that the magnitude of the penalty should be commensurate with the
magnitude of the cost savings. Put another way, do not impose small penalties
for big violations and vice versa.
As a final comment, it should be clear from this discussion that any
penalty system should be based on a clear linkage between cost savings and
quality reductions. This may seem like an obvious point, but as we have
discussed briefly above, the California PUC incorporated a comparison with
a "national rate index" into its PBR incentive system. This makes little sense
124. For a discussion of this problem, see RICHARD T, CARSON AND ROBERT C.
MITCHELL, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION (1989).
125. For an analysis of the various methods, see id.
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because SDG&E's position in such an index is influenced far more by
exogenous factors such as relative fuel prices than by its own managerial
acumen.
4. The California PBR Experiment
In its application to the PUC, SDG&E proposed three quality control
mechanisms involving employee safety, customer satisfaction, and system
reliability. In addition, it proposed a national rate comparison as a fourth
performance indicator. It further proposed that the system employ a so-called
"two way conditionality," or symmetrical system of penalties and rewards for
reductions and improvements in quality relative to the established
thresholds. 126
The proposed Employee Safety performance indicator was based on the
"lost-time frequency standard" employed by the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration ("OSHA"). It measures total employee lost time against
total employee working hours. SDG&E proposed a benchmark of 1.20 units
of OSHA lost time, with $3 million of rewards for moving below the
benchmark and up to $5 million in penalties for moving above it.
The Customer Satisfaction performance indicator was based on customer
survey data in the company's Customer Service Monitoring System. The
established benchmark was set at 92 percent "very satisfied" with a $2 million
maximum reward for 95 percent or above very satisfied, and a $2 million
maximum penalty for 89 percent or below very satisfied.
The System Reliability Indicator was based on a "System Average
Interruption Duration Index." The benchmark was set at 70 minutes with a plus
or minus range of 20 minutes, a $100,000 adjustment per one-half minute
decrease or increase in adjusted interruptions, and a maximum $4 million
reward or penalty.
Finally, the national rate performance indicator was based on SDG&E's
ranking in a National Rate Index compiled annually by the Edison Electric
Institute. The benchmark was pegged at 137, with $10 million in potential
penalties or rewards. In supporting this index on behalf of SDG&E, the
Division of Ratepayer Advocates argued that "California is an island of high
electricity prices" and that the rate index goes directly to the rate problem "by
focusing on national rates and setting a benchmark that requires SDG&E's
performance to improve relative to national performance."' 27
In its critique of SDG&E's performance indicators, UCAN opposed two-
way conditionality. It argued that "rewards for non-price factors were not
126. See Joint Testimony, supra note 34, at 16-21.
127. UCAN's Opening Concurrent Brief, supra note 39, at 21.
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warranted" and further pointed out that even the Division of Ratepayer
Advocates which supported SDG&E's overall plan agreed with this point of
view.12 UCAN also argued that the benchmarks for each of the various
indicators were set too high because they relied upon historical performance
to arrive at a performance level. According to UCAN, "SDG&E should be
judged based upon the company's present performance, not upon historical
performance. "129
With regard to specific indicators, UCAN further argued that existing
state and federal regulations were sufficient to motivate the maintenance of
employee safety standards and that any further rewards were "not necessary."
UCAN also called for the development of "more sophisticated customer service
indicators."130 Finally, UCAN stated that "the national rate index is a deeply
flawed proxy of the environment in which SDG&E managers will have to
make decisions."' 31
In its decision, the ALJ rejected all of UCAN's criticisms and proclaimed
SDG&E's approach "not only reasonable, but essential for achieving the
objectives and criteria of regulatory reform. "132 As discussed above, the
result is that SDG&E shareholders received $7 million in rewards associated
with the quality control mechanism. Three million dollars were received for
SDG&E's non-price performance regarding employee safety, even though the
company failed to meet its 1994 safety goal. 33 More importantly, SDG&E
received an additional $2 million based on its performance relative to the
national rate index. This was despite the fact that, based on its rates, SDG&E's
position on the index actually rose-from 132 percent in 1992 to 135 percent
during the PBR period.134
IV. PBR in One-Period and Multi-Period Models
Proponents of PBR frequently cite two broad applications for this
regulatory experiment. 135 First, PBR is advanced as a useful transitional
128. Id. at 66.
129. Id. at 66.
130. Id. at 68.
131. Id. at 71.
132. AJ Decision, supra note 32, at 69.
133. SDG&E achieved a score of 1.04 on the OSHA Lost-time Accident index. Its goal
was 1.00.
134. The remaining $2 million in performance bonuses came about from improved
customer satisfaction, as measured by a customer survey.
135. The most concise statement is perhaps that offered by the Division of Ratepayers
Advocates: "A performance-based regulatory approach for those functions that remain in the
monopoly, or customer access side of the business, and the discipline of marketplace competition
in the generation side of the business." Div. OF RATEPAYER ADVOCATES, CAL. PUB. UTIL.
COMM'N, supra note 1, at 11-15.
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ratemaking tool along the road to a more radical deregulation of
technologically changing and increasingly competitive industrial sectors such
as electricity generation and telecommunications. This type of application is
consistent with a one-period model during which PBR replaces RBR and then,
at the end of the period, full deregulation occurs. Second, PBR is touted as
an evolutionary reform of traditional rate base regulation for industrial sub-
sectors characterized by monopolistic economies of scale or density such as
electricity and gas distribution. This application is more consistent with a
multi-period model in which the PBR "game" is played over and over.
As we shall discuss below, utility managers in the two models face
different types of incentives, with utility managers in the multi-period model
facing a set of incentives that give rise to strategic behavior. An analysis of
these differing incentives suggests that PBR is more likely to be effective in
a one-period model.
A. The One-Period Model
In a one-period framework, the PBR regulator sets a baseline, provides
the utility with incentives to beat the baseline, and at the end of the period
deregulates the utility. Under such conditions, regulated industries would have
two unambiguous incentives to pursue the cost minimization point.
The first incentive is internal to PBR, and it is driven by the potential
savings available from the sharing mechanism. A priori, there is no reason to
expect utility managers not to respond appropriately to a well-designed sharing
mechanism.
The second incentive is external and is driven by the competitive
pressures of the market place. Utility managers now operating with the rate
protection of the regulatory umbrella will generally find it in the interest of
the firm to use the PBR period to "get into shape" for the rigors of competition
waiting at the end of the experiment. These managers can generally be
expected to respond fully to whatever incentives are offered by the PBR
system. 136
It follows from this observation that PBR may be best suited to industries
which are candidates for deregulation such as telecommunications and
electricity generation. In this regard, the question arises as to why such
industries even need a transitional PBR period: why not simply deregulate them
136. In industries facing increasing external competition and impending deregulation, PBR
may not even be necessary to induce cost minimizing behavior on the part of utilities. Consider,
for example, that many electric utilities now face a serious threat from customer direct access and
economic bypass. In the face of higher rates, many municipalities are considering generating their
own power. However, the loss of such large customers from a utility's grid can dramatically
increase its fixed costs per kilowatt hour and put even more upward pressure on rates.
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and let the various firms compete?
This is a point well-taken. One argument behind using PBR as a
transitional bridge, however, is that firms that have been operating inefficiently
under the regulatory umbrella need some time to make a successful adjustment
to the competitive marketplace. In the absence of such a "grace period," they
are likely to sustain heavy losses which would accrue to their shareholders.
Such losses would not be "fair" to investors who originally made their
investments based upon the assumption of a regulated marketplace.
It follows from this equity argument that PBR can be a useful tool to help
the utility become sufficiently competitive to retain its customers. However,
regulators should not ignore the option of immediate deregulation without a
transitional bridge. The comparative merits of single-period PBRs leading to
deregulation versus straight deregulation is an area which merits further study.
In this regard, a second argument for the use of PBR as a transitional tool
addresses possible institutional constraints on immediate and complete
deregulation. This argument may be highlighted by an example from the
ongoing debate over restructuring in California.
On May 24, 1995, California's PUC issued Decision 95-05-045. It
included a "Proposed Policy Decision Adopting a Preferred Industry Structure"
("Majority Proposal") voted for by a majority of the Commission and
championed by California PUC chairman Daniel Fessler.' The Majority
Proposal argues that neither nuclear nor hydro plants can realistically be
privatized and deregulated because of "the difficulty that would be entailed in
trying to transfer the ownership and operation of these plants to another party
because of extensive and various licenses needed from federal and state
authorities to operate these units. "38
To address this issue, the Majority Proposal recommends that both hydro
and nuclear assets be kept out of the spot market along with hydroelectric
power and that both types of power be priced beneath the regulatory umbrella
using a mechanism like PBR because: "There is a symmetry in bundling
together the lower-priced hydroelectric resources with the higher-priced nuclear
generating resources."""
B. The Multi-Period Model
More complicated game-theoretic behavior may arise when PBR rates
are determined in a recurring, multi-period framework. Such a framework is
137. CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, supra note 30.
138. Id. at55. The Majority Proposal may beoverstating the licensing problems associated
with hydro facilities. At least at FERC, transferring hydro licenses does not require a lengthy
review in the same way that a new license does.
139. Id. at 55.
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contemplated for industrial sectors such as electricity and gas distribution
where, despite advances in technology, characteristics of a natural monopoly
remain.
In a game-theoretic world, utility managers will weigh the benefits of
achieving cost savings in any given period against the loss of utility and
degrees of freedom in all future periods. To see this, suppose that in the initial
period t, the utility behaves exactly like the PBR regulator wants. That is,
utility managers respond to PBR incentives by undertaking the appropriate
actions and investments, the firm's cost curve is shifted from the observed AC
to the minimum AC, and the utility operates at point B rather than at point A
in Figure Two. What have utility managers given up?
If we make the likely assumption that point B will be the new starting
point or baseline for the next period in the PBR cycle, the utility will have
nowhere further to go in reducing its costs. In exchange for the cost savings
achieved in this first period, the utility and its managers must forego the
perquisites associated with the "quiet life" of operating at the more comfortable
observed cost structure in succeeding periods."4 Moreover, from an agency
theory point of view, the scope of this problem will be amplified the greater
the separation between ownership of the firm and managerial control.
While the results of this calculus are theoretically indeterminate and no
doubt specific to each firm and its regulatory environment,' at least one
thing should be clear: PBR is generally less likely to be successful at motivating
cost minimization in a multi-period framework of continuing regulation than
in the "one period and deregulate" model.
It follows from this observation that the PBR regulator might also want
to consider the use of a more innovative type of "managerial PBR" to help
address the agency problem '42 Such a form of PBR might incorporate the
opportunity for management to share in some of the cost savings achieved
under PBR. Such incentive plans are regularly used in the private sector under
the rubric of "profit sharing" and "performance bonuses" and would provide
managers with appropriate incentives to minimize costs.
It should be noted, however, that tying managerial compensation to utility
performance may raise some difficult political issues with ratepayer advocacy
groups who already frequently complain about the high salaries of executives
in the industry. It should also be noted that what now passes for managerial
140. At the same time, with less of a cushion to rely on, the utility also increases the
probability of rate suppression, i.e., that its next baseline will be set below AC,°.
141. This area is a potentially rich topic for game theorists.
142. The kinds of managerial PBRs currently used do not generally allow managers to
share in any of the bounty achieved through cost saving investments. Indeed, some of these PBRs
include managerial salaries as a target for reduction which would work in the opposite direction
desired, at least from an agency theory point of view. More generally, managerial PBRs target
items such as debt ratios and the number of employees per customer for improvement.
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PBRs only reward shareholders for good management practices and do not
address the agency theory problem.
As stated earlier, the best antidote to the agency theory problem is
increased competition in all sectors of the electricity market. In this regard,
it is important to remember that in many cases PBR systems will be
implemented as part of a broader restructuring of the electricity industry.
At present, there are two major competing paradigms for such
restructuring: "Direct Access" and "Poolco." Direct Access is favored by free
market proponents because it allows buyers and sellers to directly negotiate
electricity prices and terms of service, a practice now largely forbidden. To
facilitate Direct Access, electricity generators must be allowed to transmit or
"wheel" their power directly to customers. This involves wholesale wheeling,
or sending bulk power over the transmission grid. It also entails the critical
step of retail wheeling, or transmitting electricity from the transmission grid
over the distribution grid into homes, factories and businesses.
The Massachusetts Department of Utilities recently embraced Direct
Access and ordered each utility in its jurisdiction to develop an individual
restructuring plan consistent with expanded customer choice. Small-scale retail
wheeling experiments are also under way in Michigan and Maine, while the
New Hampshire state legislature has passed a bill calling for the PUC to begin
a pilot retail wheeling program. Other experiments have been proposed by
industrial consumers in Illinois and Indiana. 43
The other restructuring approach is known as "Poolco." This approach
was endorsed by the California PUC in its Majority Proposal,'" and it is
currently being used in Great Britain.'45 Under a pure Poolco, buyers and
sellers cannot voluntarily negotiate price and terms of sale directly with one
another. 46 Instead, they must buy and sell power at one transparent price.
This price is set in a spot market based on bids received from buyers and
sellers. All aspects of these transactions, from bidding to dispatch and billing,
are administered by a centralized and mandatory power pool that critics have
called "the monopolist's new clothes." 47
While there is great debate over which approach is preferable, one thing
143. For a state-by-state restructuring summary, see Industrial Energy Bulletin, supra note
31.
144. CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, supra note 30.
145. See Tim Woolf, Retail Competition in the Electricity Industry. Lessons from the United
Kingdom, ELECTRICITY J., May 1994, at 56-63.
146. One variant on Poolco allows buyers and sellers to enter into "contracts for
differences" that allow them to negotiate price discounts and other terms of service. While Poolco
supporters say such contracts allow "virtual direct access" and make Poolco equivalent to Direct
Access, Direct Access proponents sharply disagree.
147. Robert Michaels, Wholesale Pooling: The Monopolist's New Clothes, ELECTRICrrY
J., October 1994, at 64-76.
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is clear: the Direct Access approach will inspire far more competition than
Poolco. At least from the standpoint of addressing the agency problem, this
Direct Access approach should be preferred to Poolco.'48
C. The Califomia PBR Experience
Beyond its current PBR experiment and as part of a broader reform, the
California PUC has embarked on a comprehensive plan to restructure the
state's electricity industry. 49 This ambitious restructuring plan includes: (1)
the replacement of RBR with PBR in the distribution market; (2) fair and open
access to the transmission grid; and (3) the deregulation of the electricity
generation market.
The PUC is moving forward on full deregulation of electricity generation
because it believes that rapid technological change has eliminated significant
economies of scale in the generation market. Hence, this market is no longer
a "natural monopoly" requiring the "visible foot" of rate regulation. On the
other hand, the PUC also believes that significant economies of density, scope,
and scale remain in the distribution market. Hence, rate regulation is necessary
to control this natural monopoly, but the PUC favors a more market-oriented
PBR to traditional RBR.
1. The Multi-Period Model
Within the context of the above theoretical discussion, the use of PBR
as a substitute for RBR in the distribution market is consistent with the multi-
period, recurring game model. Because the PUC has already adopted an
arguably deeply-flawed, precedent-setting PBR mechanism in its experiment
with SDG&E, it is unlikely that the PBR regulatory outcome will improve on
the RBR status quo.
As we have outlined in this Article, the California PBR appears to violate
each of the three major principles of effective PBR: (1) it uses a firm-specific
methodology that runs the risk of setting the baseline revenue requirement too
high; (2) it has embraced a regressive rather than a progressive sharing
mechanism that typically will not maximize cost savings; and (3) its quality
control mechanism contains unnecessary rewards as well as at least one
parameter that is irrelevant.
148. For further discussion, see Peter Navarro, The Case for Radical Deregulation of
Electric Utilities, HARV. BUs. REV. (forthcoming Jan.-Feb., 1996).
149. For an in-depth discussion, see Navarro, supra note 8.
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2. The Single-Period Model
Besides replacing RBR with PBR in the electricity distribution market,
the Commission has also proposed using PBR in the generation market as a
bridge to complete deregulation of that market. In particular the PUC has
proposed that the utilities' existing nuclear and hydro plants be put under PBR
for their remaining service life rather than be allowed to compete in the
deregulated spot market.
The Commission may well have better success in this "one-period"
application of PBR for the reasons articulated above, principally the need for
utilities to compete. The fact remains, however, that the Commission has
embraced a set of working principles contrary to the effective use of PBR.
Unless the Commission embraces an SBM approach, adopts a progressive
sharing mechanism, and streamlines its quality control mechanism, it is
unlikely to achieve the best results.
D. Agency Theory and the PBR
As discussed in Section II.A1 above, utility maximizing managers in a
regulatory environment face strong incentives to bloat the average cost curve
by using the firm's revenue stream to finance the consumption of "expense
preferences" and perquisites such as larger and more plush offices, the use of
corporate jets or company cars, excessive staff, etc.15° Such consumption
of "perks" may be traced back to the separation of ownership and control in
the modern corporation. This separation in an imperfect capital market allows
managers to pursue their own goals at the expense of shareholders.'
To date, the PBR experiment has not specifically acknowledged this
"agency theory" problem except, perhaps, in the design and implementation
of specific Managerial PBRs. The question arises as to what extent this is
likely to defeat the goals of PBR. The answer depends on whether it is
implemented in a single or multi-period model.
1. The Single-Period Model
There are several important factors at work that may help to mitigate the
150. There is a rich literature on the topic of utility maximization and expense preferences
that arguably begins with the path-breaking theory of managerial discretion set forth in OLIVER
E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR: MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES IN
A THEORY OF THE FIRM (1964).
151. This issue is also often discussed in terms of the "principal-agent" problem. For
discussion within the context of incentive regulation, see GLENN BLACKMON, INCENTIVE
REGULATION AND THE REGULATION OF INCENTIVES (1994).
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agency theory problem in the single-period model where PBR is used as a
bridge to deregulation. In this single-period application, and as argued above,
utility managers will face strong external competitive pressures to minimize
their costs. As we know from agency theory, the greater the degree of market
competition, the less likely utility managers will use corporate funds to
consume "perks" and expense preferences. Competitive pressures in a single-
period generation market framework come from two sources.
First, recent engineering and scientific advances have resulted in the
emergence of highly efficient, natural gas-fired generation units.'52 At least
at currently low natural gas prices, these plants can compete favorably with
traditional central station powerplants characterized by large economies of
scale, like those fueled by coal, one of the cheapest forms of baseload
generation.' 53 As Yeager has noted: "[Tihe economic choice today is to
quickly install these smaller, Brayton-cycle [gas-fired] combustion turbine units
(25 to 250 MW) . . . .These can be installed at one-half to one-third the
capital cost of conventional steam-electric stations[.]"154
The low capital costs associated with building gas-fired units have
significantly lowered barriers to entry in the generation market, thereby
increasing both the rate of entry into the market, as well as its potential
contestability. Thus, as long as natural gas prices remain relatively low, both
actual entry and the "contestable" threat of additional entry into the electricity
generation market may help to inhibit managerial expense preference behavior.
This threat alone will not be sufficient to deter expense preference
behavior. In fact, a PBR implemented for, say, a nuclear powerplant operating
in an otherwise deregulated market essentially guarantees the utility a fixed
price regardless of what the price in the deregulated spot market might be.
Having acknowledged this, utilities nationwide are also facing an
increasing threat of bypass of their systems. Such bypass, a form of indirect
contestability, can occur at the individual consumer level when customers like
large industrial consumers choose to self-generate. Bypass can also occur at
the local level when a city uses its powers to "municipalize" the distribution
152. For an optimistic view of the impact of technological change, see Vinod Dar, The
Future of the U.S. Electric Utility Industry, ELECTRICrrY J., July 1995, at 17-18. Dar predicts
that "The modern gas turbine ... will profitably deliver power for less than 3.0 cents per kwh
at the busbar, making both new stand-alone merchant and industrial and larger commercial on-site
generation fiercely competitive." Id. at 18. Dar also predicts that other technological developments
such as electricity storage systems and next generation renewable technologies will make
generation a highly competitive sector. Id.
153. See, e.g., Vikram Budhraja, Generation asaBusiness-Facts, Fumbles, Fictions and
the Future, ELECTRICITY J., July 1995, at 36, 37 ("Our marginal generation cost for oil in the
early 80s was six cents per kWh. Today it is two cents per kWh using natural gas. Generating
electricity by burning natural gas ... is cheaper than producing power in even the most efficient,
new combined-cycle power plants[.]").
154. Kurt Yeager, Technology and Industry Structure, ELECTRICITY J., July 1995, at 58.
151
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grid. In either case, this indirect contestability of the market puts significant
pressures on utility executives to minimize costs.
2. The Multi-Period Model
As we have argued above, in a multi-period model in which PBR is used
as a substitute for traditional RBR, utility managers face significant incentives
and opportunities to "game" the PBR system. Nonetheless, as was noted in
Section IV.B, it may be possible to improve the outcome if innovative
managerial PBRs are developed and if PBR in general is implemented within
the context of a more comprehensive restructuring framework that features
direct customer access and competitive "retail wheeling. "'55
In this regard, it may be worth restating that, at least thus far, the
California PUC has rejected the Direct Access-Retail Wheeling approach in
favor of a more centralized restructuring approach. In contrast, on the East
Coast, regulators seem more inclined to embrace the Direct Access-Retail
Wheeling model.
V. Summary and Policy Implications
Performance-Based Ratemaking is currently touted as an evolutionary
reform of traditional rate base regulation and as a useful transitional step
towards complete deregulation. It promises to be one of the most important
forces shaping public utility regulation well into the next century. The PBR
experiment is motivated not only by traditional concerns over ratepayer equity
but also by a growing realization that inefficient regulation can play an
important role in reducing competitive advantage in an increasingly global
economy.
The basic premise motivating the PBR movement is that under traditional,
cost-plus RBR, utility managers will not only fail to minimize costs but also
strategically attempt to conceal the firm's true minimum cost curve. The reason
may be traced to a set of "perverse incentives" that encourages managers to
inflate the firm's operation and maintenance expenses, "goldplate" or over-
invest in capital, avoid optimal risk-taking, and otherwise operate inefficiently.
This paper has presented an economic framework for designing,
evaluating, and implementing Performance-Based Ratemaking systems to
address this "cost minimization-cost revelation" problem. We have shown that
PBR is neither good nor bad, but that application, design, and implementation
make it so. We have also shown that PBR presents the regulator with three
155. See generally Navarro, supra note 8 (discussing various issues involved in




basic paradoxes that must be resolved in order for PBR to succeed: (1) while
the PBR regulator seeks to encourage the utility to operate at minimum cost,
asymmetric information and strategic gaming by the utility prevents the
regulator from knowing the firm's true cost structure; (2) while the best
incentive to insure that the utility pursues maximum cost savings is to simply
give all the savings to the utility, this defeats the basic goal of reducing the
cost of service to utility customers and enhancing their economic
competitiveness; and (3) while any effective PBR system requires a quality
control mechanism to prevent utilities from cutting quality to achieve false
"cost savings," such a mechanism is difficult to implement and entails
significant transaction costs due to the fact that changes in quality are difficult
to value given their status as non-marketed goods.
In light of these paradoxes, the policy question faced by the PBR
regulator is whether PBR will be a positive force for change, or simply another
failed variation on the traditional "regulatory game." The findings of this
Article suggest that the PBR experiment may well fail for the same reason that
traditional RBR has, namely, strategic behavior of regulated firms with an
advantage in asymmetric information. It follows that would-be reformers
should approach the PBR experiment with less zeal and more caution than
currently exhibited in some quarters. Indeed, there is a significant risk that a
poorly designed PBR system will exacerbate, rather than eliminate, regulatory
inefficiencies. It may also destroy, rather than help to create, competitive trade
advantage.
With these caveats in mind, it should be clear that once the decision is
made to implement a PBR system, the mechanics and desired properties are
relatively straightforward. First, the PBR regulator should be careful not to
set the baseline revenue requirement too high or too low at the beginning of
the period. In this regard, the use of Statistical Benchmark Modeling to
determine the firm's true minimum cost structure should be encouraged. As
with traditional RBR, the PBR regulator should also be careful not to
incorporate excessive escalator and indexing factors or pass-through
mechanisms that effectively remove any incentives for the utility to minimize
its costs in specific areas. Second, the sharing mechanism should be
progressive rather than regressive. It should also contain as many tiers as is
administratively cost-effective. The exception to this progressive rule is the
case where the regulated firm can clearly demonstrate that potential cost
savings are small and difficult to achieve. In such a case, a better regulatory
strategy might simply be to forego the PBR experiment because the potential
gains are small relative to the risks involved. Third, the quality control
mechanism should include, at a minimum, worker safety, system reliability,
and customer service. It should exclude any parameters or indices not directly
affected by the firm's strategic behavior. Fourth, the quality control mechanism
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should directly link cost sharing benefits with the penalties for quality
deterioration. Most important, any penalties should be of a similar magnitude
to the cost savings benefits.
Within the context of these three basic PBR principles, it should be clear
that PBR is unlikely to meet one of its major goals, namely, to significantly
reduce administrative costs. The analytical problems associated with setting
the baseline revenue requirement alone are formidable and resource intensive
and will require proceedings similar to those now used in the general rate case
format of traditional RBR. At the same time, the information requirements for
designing an appropriate sharing mechanism are non-trivial, as are the resource
requirements for adequately valuing non-marketed amenities such as customer
service and employee safety when setting penalties in the quality control
mechanism.
The bottom line is that PBR is unlikely to be a panacea for the ills of
traditional RBR. As demonstrated above, this is particularly true when PBR
is applied in a multi-period model of continuing regulation as opposed to the
"one-period and deregulate" model. If the initial outcome of the California
experiment with PBR has demonstrated anything, it is that PBR will be subject
to exactly the same kind of strategic gaming and undesirable outcomes that
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